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Abstract
This thesis examines the current British Columbia child protection legislative 
framework. The central focus is the British Columbia Child, Family and Community 
Service Act (1996). My primary research question is the extent to which children’s rights 
as outlined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights o f  the Child (1989) are 
reflected in key provisions of this legislation. Three secondary research questions are: 
whether the due process and procedural measures provided for in the legislation are 
sufficient in terms of children’s rights; whether the child advocacy measures are 
sufficient from a children’s rights perspective; and the extent to which the treatment of 
children’s rights in the child protection legislation diverges from or reconciles with 
critical social work and feminist theory.
My main findings are that the British Columbia child protection legislation lacks 
in terms of children’s rights in several significant ways, notably, in a failure to 
incorporate adequate due process, procedural and advocacy measures for children. 
Drawing on both legal analysis and critical inquiry, this thesis outlines recommendations 
for reform to the British Columbia child protection legislation and overarching legal 
structure to more effectively address the rights of children in this province. In addition, I 
argue for a proactive, multi-dimensional and child rights focused social work practice in 
the field of child welfare.
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Introduction
Social workers have an important role in the provision of child protection services in 
British Columbia. Callahan and Callahan (1997) identify the centrality of the profession of 
social work in child welfare policy and services. It is my hope that in embarking on this human 
rights based analysis of British Columbia child protection legislation, I will contribute to further 
development of contemporary social work policy and practice in highlighting certain human 
rights considerations for child protection service delivery. To engage with this analysis of the 
child protection legislative framework, I shall also employ critical inquiry. Because the 
concentration of child protection is heavily legislated, it is a subject area where law and social 
work clearly intersect. I will discuss specific legal issues that have not been explored in depth in 
social work literature relating to British Columbia child protection legislation while at the same 
time, striving to import a critical lens to the legal analysis I employ.
My focus is provisions of the governing law establishing child protection services in the 
province of British Columbia, the Child, Family and Community Service Act (1996). In addition, 
I expect to peripherally consider the applicability of other related British Columbia laws 
including the Office fo r  Children and Youth Act (2002) and the Ombudsman Act (1996). In order 
to establish a legal framework for child rights, I shall draw primarily from the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights o f  the Child (1989) (“the Convention”). In addition, I will consider 
relevant Canadian case law that provides assistance in legally defining and explaining human 
rights more generally and the legal nature of children’s rights more specifically in Canada. As a 
further component of my analysis, I consider the recommendations of the 1995 Report o f  the 
Gove Inquiry into Child Protection in British Columbia (“the Gove Report”) and the extent of 
implementation to date. I shall consider and apply critical theoretical writings, most particularly
in the fields of child welfare and justice.
Chapter one sets out the context of the study including the significance of child protection 
in British Columbia, research questions and methodological approach. Chapter two provides an 
overview of the Convention. In chapter three, I address the historical context and overall 
structure of the British Columbia child protection legislation. Chapter four involves a more 
detailed examination of key provisions of the British Columbia child protection legislative 
framework as they relate to children’s rights. In chapter five, I move into a discussion of critical 
literature relating to the overarching themes I discuss, notably the law and child welfare policy. 
Finally, chapter six includes my findings and resulting recommendations, based on the analysis 
contained in the preceding chapters.
Chapter One: Context of the Study 
The State o f  Child Protection in British Columbia 
The British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development (“MCFD”) reports 
that in the years since the 1996 enactment of the Child, Family and Community Service Act, there 
has been a marked increase in the numbers of children in care in the province; in this time period 
until 2003, the overall number of children in care increased by over sixty per cent (British 
Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2003b). As of April 2003, MCFD 
reported that province-wide, there are over ten thousand children in the M inistry’s and delegated 
Aboriginal agencies’ care (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 
2003a & 2003b), sixty per cent of whom were in continuing custody (British Columbia Ministry 
of Children and Family Development, 2003a). Of these approximately ten thousand children in 
care, almost half are less than 12 years old (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family 
Development, 2003a).
The government reports that many of these children in care are medically fragile and have 
special needs (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2002), over fifty 
percent come from single parent homes (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family 
Development, 2002) and over the last decade, sixty-five to seventy percent of the families of 
children taken into care also received income assistance. Approximately forty per cent of 
children in care are Aboriginal children (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family 
Development, 2002). The total number of all children in care is well above the national average 
(British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2003b). In addition to 
children in care, as of spring 2003, there were over one thousand children under supervision of 
the Ministry and Aboriginal delegated agencies (British Columbia Ministry of Children and
Family Development, 2003b). Table 1.1 outlines the numbers of children in care in British 
Columbia per age category as of March 2003.
Table 1.1
Number o f  Children in Care, British Columbia, March 2003
Under 1 year 286
1 year 321
2 years 309
3 years 295
4 years 349
5 years 321
6 years 376
7 years 410
8 years 425
9 years 496
10 years 512
11 years 592
12 years 584
13 years 666
14 years 647
15 years 750
16 years 760
17 years 765
18 years 714
Source : British Columbia MCFD, Data Services Branch, March 2003 
Based on foregoing numbers and total population numbers for each age group derived
from the most recent Canadian Census conducted in 2001 (Statistics Canada, 2001), Table 1.2
contains breakdowns showing what approximate percentage of British Columbia children were in
care as of March 2003.
Table 1.2
Approximate Percentages o f Total British Columbia
Child Population Who Are in Care, British Columbia, March 2003
0 to 4 years .76%
5 to 9 years .84%
10 to 11 years 1.07 %
12 to 14 years 1.83 %
15 to 18 years 1.37 %
Source: British Columbia MCFD, Data Services Branch, March 2003 and Statistics Canada, 2001 Census
As of April 2003, the government reported for the first time since the enactment of the 
Child, Family and Community Service Act in 1996 that there was seven per cent less children in 
care than in June 2001 (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2003b). 
Other decreases of children in care during this period include: a decrease of 12.4 per cent of 
children under supervision orders and a decrease of 5.9 per cent of children under special needs 
agreements (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2002). The 
significance of these relative numbers is beyond the scope of this thesis but represents an issue 
worthy of further consideration and study. A possible reason for these decreases is the fiscal 
cutbacks recently introduced by the British Columbia Liberal government which may leave some 
children and their families without any form of publicly funded service.
Table 1.3 contains a breakdown of the reasons for protection investigations taking place 
between 1997 and 2003. Although less than half of these children ultimately ended up in care, it 
is worthy of note that the largest numbers of investigations relate to multiple types (a term that 
means more than one of the listed reasons) and neglect. Not publicly available from MCFD is a 
further breakdown of the multiple types category.
Table 1.3
Protection Investigations, Fiscal Year Totals, British Columbia
Allegation type 1997/98 1998/99 1999/2000 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03
Physical abuse 4,696 4,404 4,439 3,943 3,832 3,327 16.3%
Sexual abuse 1,368 1,352 1,148 882 878 649 3.2%
Neglect/ not P 7,657 7,598 7,706 7,104 7,010 6,413 31.4%
Other 1,554 1,451 1,278 1,124 1,046 807 3.9%
Multiple types 8,150 9,331 9,750 9,387 10,343 9,252 45.2%
TOTAL 23,425 24,425 24,321 22,440 23,109 20,448 100%
Source : British Columbia MCFD, Data Services Branch, March 2003
According to MCFD, only thirteen per cent of child protection investigations per year
lead to applying for a court order (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family 
Development, 2003a). Consent orders are significant in child protection cases. As of March 
2003, children go into care by way of consent orders in thirty three per cent of cases (British 
Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2003a). In relation to supervision 
orders, fifty per cent of these orders are consent orders (British Columbia Ministry of Children 
and Family Development, 2003a).
I discovered upon contacting MCFD that there are some gaps around the statistics that 
they have available to the public. These gaps in statistical information relate to particular areas I 
consider in this thesis. For instance, there are no currently available government statistics to 
indicate how many child protection matters province-wide get resolved in the court process prior 
to trial nor are there numbers around what other alternatives to trial are used to resolve cases 
(British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2003a). In addition, there are 
currently no provincial government statistics about how many child protection cases are dealt 
with by way of mediation outside the court process (British Columbia M inistry of Children and 
Family Development, 2003a). It is my belief that these gaps in available empirical information 
underscore how certain issues can simply be written out of public policy. Despite the gaps, the 
available MCFD statistics support the significance of examining the issue of “child protection” in 
this province. These numbers not only provide the context for my analysis of the provincial child 
protection legislation but also highlight the importance of conducting future legislative and social 
policy analysis in this subject area.
Research Questions 
In this thesis, my primary research question is:
a. To what extent are children’s rights as outlined in the Convention reflected in the key
provisions of the British Columbia Child, Family and Community Service Act and child 
protection legislative framework in the province?
My secondary research questions are:
b. Are the due process and procedural measures provided for in the Child, Family and 
Community Service Act sufficient in terms of children’s rights?
c. How does the British Columbia child protection legislative scheme purport to understand 
the concept of child advocacy; are the provisions in the legislation pertaining to child 
advocacy sufficient from a children’s rights perspective?
d. To what extent does the treatment of children’s rights in the British Columbia child 
protection legislation reconcile with or diverge from critical social work discourse and 
what are the resulting implications of applying a critical lens to the consideration of 
children’s rights in the British Columbia child welfare legislative context?
Finally, I shall consider what, if any, changes could be implemented in the context of the child 
protection legislative framework and associated procedures.
Significance o f Study to Social Work Practice 
In my move from law practice to social work, I have become aware of the number of 
areas in which legal and social work concerns overlap, and child protection is one such area. 
What is often absent from child protection discourse however, is a common ground 
understanding between the disciplines of the issues at hand. I endeavour to address this gap 
between social work and law in moving toward a legally informed critical social work 
perspective about British Columbia child protection law. Ultimately, it is a goal of this thesis 
that social workers involved in the delivery of child services in British Columbia acknowledge
the importance of and advocate respect for children’s human rights not only in their practice but 
also in the broader development, implementation and delivery of child protection services in the 
province.
As stated, social workers have a central role in the provision of child welfare services 
including child protection in the province. There is a need for social workers to understand the 
legal and policy realm in which they operate because:
1. Of their central role;
2. The law does not establish with clarity where social workers’ expected primary loyalty
rests in the child protection context;
3. There is a lack of formal accountability measures / rights enforcement mechanisms
attaching to social workers’ involvement with child protection cases.
Child protection is an area of social work practice that has developed in a highly legalistic 
fashion (Johnson & Cahn, 1995). Currently, British Columbia is experiencing a state of flux in 
regard to the provision of social services, and child welfare services including child protection 
are very much affected by changes being implemented.
Under the current governing legal framework for child protection in British Columbia, 
child welfare social workers have a high level of responsibility and a great deal of legislated 
power. It is my view that social workers in this context somehow need to come to terms with 
whose interests they primarily serve and emphatically establish a collective guiding philosophy 
for the work they do, with the aim of injecting a further level of accountability into child 
protection service delivery in British Columbia. In further defining their roles, it is important 
that social workers appreciate and understand the human rights context of their work.
The philosophical orientation of the profession of social work is consistent with respect
for children’s human rights. Reamer (1999) cites social work values as including: respect for 
individual worth and dignity; respect of persons; valuing individuals’ capacity for change; client 
self-determination; providing opportunities to individuals to realize their potential; seeking to 
meet individuals’ basic common needs; non-discrimination; client empowerment; and social 
justice (p. 21). Both the Canadian Association of Social W orkers’ (1994) and the British 
Columbia Association of Social W orkers’ (1999) codes of ethics contain provisions that reflect 
these values but do not contain associated accountability mechanisms. Despite the written 
articulation of these ethics, the profession of social work should not become complacent. Rather, 
in the child protection realm, there is a need for social workers to identify what principles guide 
their work as professionals and to strive to have those principles put into effect.
Controversy abounds in the social work literature about whether the appropriate role for 
social work is to advocate for more state assistance for people (Mclnnis-Dittrich, 1997) or to 
challenge the existence of larger oppressive structures such as legislated regimes (Mullaly, 2002). 
Meinert (1995) states about the profession of social work more broadly, “perhaps the major issue 
facing both social work practice and education today is one of arriving at consensus about the 
central purpose of the profession” (p. 7). In addition, Meinert (1995) maintains that “an 
assumption exists within the profession that there is basic agreement about the fundamental 
purpose of social work” despite the lack of empirical support to establish whether such consensus 
exists (p. 7). Similarly, Reamer (1999) discusses how debate about the profession’s mission and 
values has been historically “considerable” (p. 13).
Child welfare agency-based work in particular is fraught with potential philosophical 
conflict, for instance, whose interests are social workers ultimately going to represent and 
protect. For instance. Savoury and Kufeldt (1997) point to a tension between doing both child
protection and family support work. Callahan (1993b) identifies how the potential for conflict is 
always present in carrying out child protection social work. Coupled with this uncertainty, the 
wording of the British Columbia Social Workers Act (1996) provides that social workers under 
the authority of the Minister of Children and Family Development need not register with the 
Board of Registration for Social Workers in British Columbia and as such, are not formally 
accountable to professional social work standards for practice established by the board. The 
Social Workers Act (1996) is the governing legislation for the profession of social work in the 
province. Section 8 of this Act states that one must not represent himself or herself as a social 
worker unless registered as such. An exception to this registration requirement is a person 
employed by the government as is currently the case for many child protection social workers. 
The effect of this lack of formal professional accountability for child protection workers is 
outstanding ambiguity about social workers’ practice standards in the child protection realm.
Additionally, Schmidt (1997) suggests that in certain cultural and geographic contexts, 
standardized ethical standards for social workers do not fit. Rhodes (1991) discusses how social 
workers face ethical dilemmas which are frequently obscure and not straightforward -  she also 
emphasizes that whether or not social workers are aware of it, certain assumptions define and 
influence social work practice. Despite these challenges with setting workable standards for 
social work generally, in the absence of identifiable and binding ethical standards, where do 
children’s rights come into play and how will they be enforced in the delivery of child protection 
services that lacks formal professional accountability measures? One might expect that in light 
of this explicit exemption in the social work legislation, the matter would be covered off in the 
governing child welfare legislation, the Child, Family and Community Service Act, but it is not. 
To the contrary. Section 101 of the Act only sets out an exemption from legal responsibility for
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social workers and others who perform functions under the Act: “No person is personally liable 
for anything done or omitted in good faith.” As things currently stand from a legal perspective, it 
appears child welfare workers engaged in child protection work pursuant to the legislation, are 
primarily responsible to the agency and the Director’s mandate whether or not that mandate is 
consistent with a child’s human rights. The wording of the legislation leaves open this 
possibility. Mullaly (2002) identifies a central paradox in social welfare work being that 
although social services focus on ameliorating social problems, “there is no agreed-upon 
definition or explanation of what a social problem is or why it occurs” (p. 3). In the context of 
child welfare work then, child protection social workers are left functioning in the legislatively 
defined context wherein abuse and neglect of children, as legally defined social problems, form 
the legal basis and provide the rationale for social work intervention.
In response to such contemporary social work practice challenges, Ife (2001) advocates a 
more proactive role for social workers; he argues that in embracing human rights standards as the 
cornerstone of practice as opposed to adhering to specific ethical standards, service users 
necessarily become more active participants in decision-making processes. According to Ife 
(2001), using children’s human rights as the starting point for social work practice not only could 
create a frame of reference for bringing about accountability in delivery of child protection 
services but also could help to provide solutions for some of these social work practice tensions. 
A focus on human rights according to Ife (2001) leads to a “stronger capacity for empowerment- 
based practice; the emphasis is on realising and protecting the rights of the client, rather than 
facilitating the professional decision-making of a social worker” (p. 105).
Mullaly (2002) outlines that legislative formulation and associated structures, such as the 
British Columbia child protection legislative scheme, are according to critical social work theory.
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problematic for assuming that members of society agree on the values and rules that should guide 
them. Critical social work theory in contrast, rests on no such assumptions but rather, actively 
seeks to challenge them with a goal of bringing about liberating social change. According to a 
critical social work approach, a thorough examination of social problems such as abuse and 
neglect of children requires an understanding of larger oppressive societal structures. Critical 
social work perspective also conceives of the rule of law, supporting ideologies, government and 
legal processes as manifestations of a larger oppressively-structured context.
In championing critical anti-oppressive social work practice, Mullaly (2002) calls for 
social work “modes of intervention that bridge the separation of existential freedom and socio­
political liberty” (p. 171). In other words, anti-oppressive social work practices at the individual 
level - such as critical child protection work - involve an appreciation and awareness of the 
connection between structural causes and personal problems (Mullaly, 2002, p. 171). At the 
structural level of practice, Mullaly (2002) calls for “confronting and changing those social 
institutions, policies, laws and economic and political systems that operate in a way that benefits 
the dominant group at the expense of subordinate groups” (p. 193).
It is my hope that this study will help lay the groundwork for critical social work practice 
that integrates aspects of both Ife’s (2001) and Mullaly’s (2002) recommendations. It is also my 
hope that this form of social work practice will further develop in the British Columbia ehild 
welfare context and will prompt social workers who work with children in this field to consider 
seriously the issue of children’s rights and how they are to be reflected in service provision.
Methodology
The qualitative methodology 1 employ is policy analysis (Patton, 1999). Patton (1999) 
outlines that when one sets out to assess the effectiveness of laws passed through data collection
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and thoughtful analysis, one is engaged in evaluation research which is a form of qualitative 
research method (p. 141). Policy analysis is also said to be largely applied research (Rossi et ah, 
1999). White (1998) stresses the importance of “reasoned and critical discourse” among 
different perspectives about a given policy statement (pp. 863-4). In undertaking this policy 
analysis, the specific methods I use include standard legal method and critical inquiry grounded 
in critical social work and legal feminist theory.
Standard Legal Method
The primary aspect of my methodology is standard legal method. For instance, when 
discussing particular terms such as “best interests of the child” in the legislation, I intend to 
approach the term from a judicially considered perspective. I apply various legal cases to the 
particular legislative provisions under consideration. My objective in this regard is to inject an 
element of legal analysis into a broader-based critical inquiry of the legislative provisions under 
study. Critical social work inquiry about child welfare policy and practice tends not to engage in 
traditional legal analysis, its focus instead being externally located critique. The legal analysis 
component is intended to provide an additional layer of depth and complexity to my discussion 
with a goal of further contributing to evolving social work understandings of these matters.
An important aspect of my legal analysis is specific consideration of the contents of the 
international statutory statement of children’s rights, the Convention. I use the Convention as a 
reference point to consider children’s rights in the British Columbia child protection legislative 
context.
Critical Inquiry
The second aspect of my methodology is critical inquiry. This aspect of my inquiry is 
grounded in critical theory which according to Mullaly (2002), is “motivated by an interest in
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those who are oppressed, is informed by a critique of domination and is driven by a goal of 
liberation . . .  [and ].. . it concerns itself with moving from a society characterized by 
exploitation, inequality and oppression to one that is emancipatory and free from domination” 
(pp. 15-16). He suggests that what distinguishes critical theory from other social theories is its 
focus on change rather than only understanding (Mullaly, 2002). In the words of Freire (2001), 
“To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognize its causes, so that 
through transforming action they can create a new situation” (p. 47). A focus of the critical 
inquiry I employ is to attempt to identify and address oppression. According to Mullaly (2002), 
an aspect of oppression is a lack of “rights that the dominant group takes for granted” (p. 28). In 
approaching the question of oppression, I consider the interrelationship between such social 
trends as poverty, family composition, and age and gender discrimination on the one hand and a 
number of the legal concepts and formal statements of rights I analyze on the other hand in order 
to reach a more complex understanding of human rights and the extent of their inclusion in the 
legislation under study.
Saulnier (1996) outlines the complementary relationship between feminist theory and 
social work, and Mullaly (1997) identifies critical feminism as a particular example of a critical 
social work inquiry. Feminist legal theory is a particular approach to understanding within the 
broader critical feminist perspective (Rhode, 1991). As I will demonstrate, this critical feminist 
discourse has particular relevance to the issue of child protection, specifically as constructed in 
the British Columbia legislative context.
Feminist legal theory specifically focuses on the law and legal system. Some feminist 
legal theorists suggest that the contents of the written law contribute to and reinforce the 
“masculinization” of the legal system and order. Law then becomes a particular discursive
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resource as described by Fraser (1989). Fraser (1989) defines “sociocultural means of 
interpretation and communication” as a “historically, culturally specific ensemble of discursive 
resources available to members of a given collectivity in pressing claims against each other” (p. 
164). In western capitalist societies according to this view, such discursive resources lead to 
patterns of domination and subordination (Fraser, 1989). As MacKinnon (1989) states, “The 
liberal state coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interest of men as a 
gender - through its legitimizing norms, forms, relation to society and substantive policies. The 
state’s formal norms recapitulate the male point of view on the level of design” (pp. 161-2).
Because the goal of critical inquiry is to arrive at an understanding of the supporting 
politic of domination or oppression, it becomes relevant to consider how “identities are 
discursively constructed” (Lindenmeyer, 2000, p. 129). In my consideration of British Columbia 
child protection law, 1 intend to analyze certain provisions of the Child, Family and Community 
Service Act, related legislation and case law, as these provisions and the supporting structures 
concern children who form a vulnerable group in society. Cornell (1991) maintains that, “Within 
feminine jurisprudence, we can and should understand the deconstructability of law to open up 
the space for the reinterpretation and reinvention that allows feminist inroads into the law” (p. 
111).
Reinharz (1992) discusses how feminist scholars support moving beyond disciplinary 
boundaries as a viable social science approach. My belief is that analysis grounded in feminist 
critique adds to and complements standard legal method in understanding the content of the law. 
Not only do feminists theorize about the causes, nature and effect of oppression in society but 
also, feminist theorists seek to move beyond the status quo. Because children are among the 
most vulnerable members of society, legal feminist theory, with its discourse directed at
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dissecting and challenging subordination and oppression in the law and legal system (Fraser, 
1989; MacKinnon, 1989; Smart, 1989; Baier, 1994; West, 1997; Lacey, 1998; Moller Okin, 1989 
& 1999; Young, 1999), contains some insights and understandings which have direct 
applicability and relevance to children. Using a gendered perspective to explain women’s 
subordination, this feminist discourse speaks to the context, essenee, substance and meaning of 
rights (Benhabib, 1987; Smart, 1989; Moller Okin, 1989, Rhode 1991; Comack, 1999). In 
addition, critical feminists have explored the areas of families and child welfare and child 
protection more specifically as subject areas falling within feminist concern (Callahan, 1993a & 
1993b; Krane, 1997; Swift, 1995 & 2001). For these reasons, critieal feminist analysis provides 
a useful method of analysis to engage with the fragility and elusiveness of children’s rights as 
treated and understood by the law and society.
Fook (2002) identifies that aspects of a critical approach include: “the recognition of 
interactive and reflective ways of knowing; the recognition of the connections between structural 
domination and personal self-limitations; and the recognition of possibilities for both personal 
and social change” (p. 17). In engaging with this critical inquiry, I bring to the analysis my own 
narrative and experiences of having practised human rights and family law as a lawyer and 
studied critical theory from a social work perspective.
During the course of my legal education in Victoria, British Columbia, and experience as 
a lawyer predominantly in Prince George, British Columbia, I witnessed trends of domination 
and oppression in the legal system which transcended a legal framework of understanding.
While employed as a lawyer, I frequently found myself limited in what I could do to assist more 
economically and socially vulnerable persons in the legal context due to constraints that blocked 
their access to and full participation in the legal system. In this way, I often came face to face
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with my own limitations as a potential advocate within the legal framework. It is for this reason 
that I believe it is important that I also use critical inquiry as I proceed with this study.
I have made further sense of some of my own experiences with the law through 
conversations I have had with colleagues working in the legal field, conversations on which I 
also intend to draw as I embark on this analysis. Although I have worked as a lawyer in a 
number of cases involving children, I have not yet had the opportunity to engage in child- 
centered advocacy work. Much legal work for children is done through adult representatives of 
the children and not on their own right. A further limitation of my experience and understanding 
is that I have not worked in the child protection field as a social worker.
My experience as a lawyer provided me with context for understanding that formal legal 
statements of rights alone insufficiently protect more vulnerable members of society including 
children from experiencing oppression. The content of the law is only as strong as the means 
available to enforce it and is subject to interpretation by persons who may lack a broader 
understanding of and sensitivity to overarching trends of oppression in society. The content of 
the law rather than the broader social context guides judicial legal interpretation so if legislation 
lacks provisions addressing oppression, so too will the interpretation of those legal instruments.
My social work education has reinforced and added depth to my legal practice perspective 
that broader trends of oppression frequently goes unaddressed in the existing child protection 
legal framework. While enrolled in the University of Northern British Columbia Social Work 
Program, I had the opportunity to travel to Bolivia as a volunteer coopérant to work at addressing 
women’s human rights in a social development context. The program was funded by the 
Canadian International Development Agency. What I discovered in that country is that 
statements of international human rights are only as strong as the means by which to protect and
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enforce them in a given country. I also discovered that human rights cannot be taken and treated 
as a stand-alone issue removed from the broader social context of people’s lives.
In Bolivia, I witnessed how the majority of children in that country live in poverty and 
spend long hours either working in demanding jobs in which they are paid next to nothing or 
begging in the streets. The families of many children cannot afford to adequately provide for 
these children, and the children must go out and fend for themselves at very young ages. I saw in 
Bolivia a shortage of tangible means for protecting children from exploitation, poverty and lack 
of opportunity. This phenomenon prevails despite regular rights-focused international funding 
accompanied by strong formal statements of children’s rights and the presence of United Nations 
funded organizations in the country. This experience in Bolivia led me to consider the question 
of children’s rights in the British Columbia context and to question how this province’s law 
measures up to international statements of children’s rights and the extent to which children’s 
rights are protected and advanced here.
Who I am and the particular experiences I have had influence my lens of understanding 
the British Columbia legislation as I draw on the tools of legal method and critical inquiry. As I 
proceed with my analysis, it is my hope to synthesize the sometimes incongruent, sometimes 
merging perspectives of legal method and critical inquiry to arrive at themes which both address 
and transcend the “constellation of beliefs, values and techniques” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 175) of the 
traditional legal system.
Limitations o f  the Study 
An aspect of qualitative research is the researcher’s own examination and judgment of the 
data under study (Patton, 1999), an inquiry necessarily informed by the researcher’s subjective 
experience. Having grown up in an English-speaking European cultural context and having been
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trained in the legal tradition, I find it challenging to reach out beyond a traditional (liberal) legal 
views of “rights.” In approaching this thesis question from a “rights” perspective, I realize I have 
given a certain amount of deference to the liberal legal approach; however, I also feel it can be 
helpful and instructive to engage in (or at least attempt) critical analysis from within the legal 
framework itself, in a sense importing critical perspective.
As I have stated, I limit my inquiry to child protection as legislatively constructed in the 
British Columbia Child, Family and Community Service Act, however, child protection is a 
limited aspect of child welfare. I have imposed this limitation on myself with the aim of more 
particularly entering into analysis of this legally defined subject area. Legal consideration by its 
very nature requires an element of specificity or constraint of subject which I realize from a more 
critical perspective, is potentially problematic, but my intent is to explore this particular subject 
area in greater depth than would be possible with a broader scope of enquiry and to be able to 
effectively use legal method as a tool of inquiry.
In writing this thesis, I am keenly aware that I do not adequately address the particular 
plight of Aboriginal children who make up the highest percentage of children currently in the 
care of British Columbia child protection services; however, to address Aboriginal children’s 
situation would far exceed the scope of this thesis due to the number and complexity of the issues 
relating to Aboriginal children (Schmidt, 1997). To discuss the various complex legalities and 
unique situation of Aboriginal children in relation to the law and child protection would take me 
far beyond the space limitations of this thesis. This subject area is rather complicated by the 
current state of flux in provincial Aboriginal child welfare policy. How Aboriginal child 
protection policy will evolve in British Columbia remains rather uncertain at the present time. 
The contents of this thesis relate to all children including Aboriginal children; however, I do not
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address the complex relationship between “child protection” and Aboriginal children in the detail 
required for adequate examination of this expansive subject. Although I draw on the Convention 
in my identification of global child rights, Aboriginal children not only have these rights but also 
have recognized Aboriginal rights at both domestic and international law. This area of research, 
though critically important and necessary, is beyond the scope of this thesis.
I also have not addressed the particular plight of children with special needs who are 
particularly vulnerable to how their rights are constructed and interpreted. As I have outlined, 
MCFD statistics indicated a recent decrease province-wide of children under special needs 
agreements (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2002). An 
important future area of research would be to examine the reasons for this decline and the 
resulting implications on the lives of children with special needs. Human rights concerns for 
children with special needs who are subject to child protection proceedings are compounded by 
the number and variety of social services many of these children need to access. Article 23 of 
the Convention speaks specifically to governments’ obligations to children with special needs 
over and above other child-centered responsibilities. Again, my discussion of the child 
protection legislation pertains to children with special needs as it does to all other children, but 
more complicated issues beyond the scope of this thesis require further consideration in relation 
to children with special needs. To consider in further depth these children’s human rights is an 
area that requires further particularized research.
20
Chapter Two: The International Convention on the Rights of the Child 
This chapter provides a context for the international Convention on the Rights o f  the 
Child in terms of history of international human rights law and the current means of 
implementation of the Convention in Canada. In addition, this chapter provides an overview of 
the key provisions of the Convention itself.
Since the 1980s, there has been formal acknowledgment and incorporation of human 
rights in Canadian law and social policy (Armitage, 1993). The notion of international human 
rights codified in international law dates back to the early 1900s. In the period shortly after 
World War n , the Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights (1949) and other international human 
rights conventions came into existence (Siegel, 1988). Two subsequent human rights treaties, 
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (1966) expanded the Universal Declaration.
With respect to children’s human rights, international convention formulation has been 
slower. The Geneva Declaration on the Rights o f  the Child (1924) marked the first 
acknowledgement that children have human rights. Subsequently, the Declaration on the Rights 
o f  the Child (1959) was created by the United Nations. These instruments together with other 
international law instruments acknowledged that children are a group especially in need of 
protection (Flekkoy & Kaufman, 1997). In November 1989, the United Nations General 
Assembly unanimously adopted the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child (“the Convention”), 
and Somalia and the United States are the only two countries that have not ratified it (Harris- 
Short, 2001). Canada ratified the Convention in 1991, thereby becoming a “State Party” to it 
(Canadian Coalition for the Rights of Children, 1997).
The Convention establishes a global statement of children’s human rights. The Preamble
21
recognizes “the inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family” and also makes reference to the rights set out in the Universal Declaration o f  Human 
Rights. This Preamble also acknowledges children’s entitlement to special care and assistance 
and their need for special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection. It further 
states children should “grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and 
understanding” and that the importance of “traditions and cultural values of people” should be 
given “due account.” Article 1 of the Convention defines “child” to mean “every human being 
below the age of eighteen years old unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is 
attained earlier.”
In addition to the Preamble, the Convention consists of two parts and fifty-four articles.
In Part I, Articles 1 to 41 set out the specific rights that children are to enjoy. Part II, the 
remainder of the Convention, sets out procedures to monitor state parties’ implementation of the 
Convention provisions. The rights set out in the Convention fall into five general categories:
1. Partnership: the need for commitment at various levels of government - provincial,
federal, international;
2. Protection: parental, state and global responsibility to protect children’s rights;
3. Participation: the right of a child to be heard in administrative, judicial and national
proceedings;
4. Provision: that the basic needs of children be met; and
5. Promotion: promoting children’s awareness of their rights (Tang et al., 1999).
A number of writers have commented on the meaning and international significance of 
the Convention, and these writers’ observations focus on the nature of emerging children’s rights. 
Veerman (1992) discusses how the rights included in it address “quality of life” in addressing
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“needs and end results” (p. 51). Lundy (1997) describes the Convention in the following terms: 
[It is] the first United Nations human rights instrument since the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights which brings together as inextricable elements of the life of an individual 
human being the full range of civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural 
rights. It can do this because it treats children as completely rounded individuals, rather 
than as elements in either political society or economic systems. . . The rights defined in 
the Convention are interdependent; you cannot take one in isolation. They must all be 
implemented simultaneously to respect the rights of every child (p. 25).
Although the Convention’s text is mostly influenced by western legal perspective and the 
“state-centric” United Nations is dominated by men of western cultural background, women and 
representatives of the “developing world” also had some influence and input in the drafting of the 
Convention (Harris-Short, 2001). According to this commentator (2001), one non-western 
notion not carried over to the text is the recognition of children’s duties, notably to family and 
community. Conversely, a part of the Convention that reflects non-western (non European- 
based) influence is the recognition of the child’s extended family (Article 5).
Although the Convention sets out a number of individual inter-connected rights that 
children possess, the Preamble of the Convention explicitly acknowledges the importance of the 
family unit as a cornerstone for children’s rights. It states, “the fam ily .. .  should be afforded the 
necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the 
community.” In this regard, the Convention addresses the importance of the child’s 
interconnectedness with the family. According to feminist theorist W est (1997), “our legal 
institutions and common law rules have failed us. . . the good connections - such as the 
sustaining and nurturing connections in a healthy parent-child relationship - are not sufficiently
23
protected, and at times are actually threatened” (pp. 2-3). According to this view, our “connected 
selves” tend to be very much neglected by a law premised on the centrality of individual human 
rights (West, 1997, p. 7). The emphasis of the Convention on family poses an intriguing 
contrast with the individualistic nature of human rights discourse as it has traditionally developed 
in western law.
The Convention is also unique in international law in that it speaks about the rights of the 
child as rights per se (Wolf, 1992), in a way similar to other international human rights 
declarations and conventions that have practicably, in recent history, been primarily predicated 
on a notion that adults are the holders of such rights (Lundy, 1997). As outlined, the notion of 
adults’ human right arises through liberal theory. John Stuart Mill in his On Liberty reflected 
that liberalism relates only to “human beings in the maturity of their faculties” (Allen, 1998, p.
6). As such, the Convention arguably marks something of a departure from protectionist notions 
in the law directed at children and enshrined in international and Canadian law such as the 
doctrine of parens patriae. Just as human right have emerged through the liberal tradition, so too 
has the doctrine of parens patriae  that relates to children and child protection; therefore, at the 
root of the contemporary shift to child rights discourse in the law rests this basic and unresolved 
tension between children’s rights on the one hand and historical protectionism and paternalism 
toward children as still reflected in current law.
In signing the Convention in 1991, Canada assumed an international responsibility not 
only to implement its provisions but also to monitor and report to the United Nations Committee 
on the Rights of the Child every five years (UNICEF, 2003). Although Canada is a signatory to 
the Convention and as such, the government undertakes to implement its provisions into child- 
related laws, the domestic character of the Canadian legal structure is also relevant to the
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question of its implementation.
Part n , Articles 42 to 45, of the Convention sets out procedures to monitor state parties’ 
implementation of the Convention provisions. First, Article 42 sets out an obligation on the 
state to undertake to make the principles set out in the Convention widely known to the public. 
Within two years of ratifying the Convention, Canada was obligated to report on the measures 
taken which give effect to the rights recognized in the Convention, which it did (United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1995a and 1995b). This reporting 
requirement carries on every five years thereafter; however, information provided in the initial 
report need not repeat basic information already provided. Canada made its second report in 
1997 (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1997). An 
interesting note in this regard is that the Convention makes no mention of what should occur if 
the government’s initial report contained information about measures implemented which were 
subsequently rescinded -  in other words, an assumption in the Convention appears to be that 
implementation of the Convention within countries will occur in a progressive linear fashion. 
There is also a stated responsibility on the part of the state in Article 44(6) of the Convention to 
make the report on implementation of the Convention widely available to the public within the 
country. Being international conventional law, there is some flexibility concerning the 
implementation of these measures.
An international Committee on the Rights of the Child, made up of elected international 
experts, was established in 1991 (UNICEF, 2003); however, due to the number of countries who 
have ratified and provide updates as to implementation of the Convention, this committee is 
behind in reviewing countries’ commitment (UNICEF, 2003). The Convention anticipated ten 
members of this committee, but there are changes underway to increase the number to eighteen
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for more effective monitoring. An important aspect of this international monitoring process is 
that the focus is on how well governments are implementing the Convention’s provisions; in 
other words, the focus is not on the private sector and individuals (UNICEF, 2003). The general 
reporting process is as follows;
1. Preparation of the initial report;
2. Pre-sessional working group;
3. Government response to a List of Issues;
4. Plenary session;
5. Follow-up to the concluding observations;
6. Requests for additional information; and
7. Periodic reporting (UNICEF, 2003).
In its first report about Canada’s implementation of the Convention into domestic law in 
1995, the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child found a “lack of progress’’ 
(Covell and Howe, p. 102). One particular area of the Committee’s observation related to 
children’s participation rights pursuant to Article 12 of the Convention. The resulting request 
made of Canada was to “provide further information on the measures taken to ensure that the 
right of the child to express his/ her views and to have those views taken into account...” (United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1995a, paragraph 8).
In a 1995 reply, the British Columbia government referred to both the establishment of 
the then Office of Advocacy for Children, Youth and Families and the guiding principle in the 
legislation that the child’s views should be taken into account (United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 1995b). In a second report in 1997 for the period January 
1993 to December 1997, the response of the Government of British Columbia included
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information for the committee about the enactment of the Child, Family and Community Service 
Act, the Children’s Commission Act (1997) and the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act
(1996). The reference to the Child, Family and Community Service Act describes it as “child- 
centered legislation.” As I shall discuss in more depth, the Children’s Commission Act (1997) 
and Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act (1996) have now been repealed.
The Canadian Coalition for the Rights of the Child with a head office in Ottawa receives 
federal government funding and is a coalition of organizations including the Canadian 
Association of Social Workers and youths concerned with the rights of children in the 
Convention. The Coalition performs a lead monitoring, educational and communications role 
concerning Canada’s implementation of the Convention. The Coalition points to the federal 
aspect of Canadian law being a complicating factor in that the federal government bound Canada 
to the Convention and yet provincial and territorial governments also have spheres of jurisdiction 
that relate to children (Canadian Coalition for the Rights of the Child, 1997).
An interesting aspect of the Coalition’s work is how it is located outside of government. 
The federal government does very little public reporting with respect to implementation of the 
Convention nor does the government engage in holistic monitoring at the national level. In 1999, 
after country-wide consultations, the Canadian Coalition for the Rights of the Child prepared a 
report entitled. The UN Convention on the Rights o f  the Child : How Does Canada Measure Up? 
In that report, the Coalition commented on the lack of national standards and fragmentation in 
child welfare, noting that child welfare services within jurisdictions are uncoordinated and 
unevenly resourced; for on-reserve Aboriginal children, service delivery is further complicated 
by jurisdictional ambiguities (Canadian Coalition for the Rights of the Child, 1999).
In May 2002, there was a United Nations Special Session of the General Assembly on
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Children to consider the net progress on implementation of the Convention’s provisions across 
the world (Canadian Coalition on the Rights of Children, 2002). Canada participated by way of 
interdepartmental committee that was made up of members of Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Development, Canadian International Development Agency, Health Canada, Status 
of Women and other federal departments (Canadian Coalition on the Rights of Children, 2002) 
as well as other individuals from the provinces and non-governmental organizations, including 
the umbrella organization, Canadian Coalition on the Rights of Children. In its non­
governmental organization report to this United National General Assembly Special Session, the 
Coalition reported the following in regard to the implementation of the Convention in Canada:
1. There is a lack of knowledge about the status and procedures for implementation of 
and compliance with the Convention;
2. Domestic concerns cloud an awareness or appreciation of international concerns and 
initiatives;
3. Children and child programs are front line targets during downturns in the economy;
4. There is urgent need for coordinated programming for Aboriginal children;
5. Cooperation among all levels of government is essential for the development of 
legislation and policy and to the provision of programs for children that are consistent 
with their rights;
6. It is important that the Convention rights be incorporated into domestic legislation 
(Canadian Coalition for the Rights of the Child, 2001, p. 38).
Discussing the formal legal status of international conventions in Canada, Hogg (1992) 
holds that they are enforceable as international law but not in domestic courts of law unless 
incorporated into federal or provincial law. The legal issue of the extent to which Canada’s
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international conventional obligations strictly bind provincial legislatures to enact consistent 
measures in their statutes remains undecided definitively at law. What is clear is that in the 
interpretation and legal application of domestic laws, if not the enactment, international law is 
both relevant and influential as in the British Columbia Court of Appeal Auton  decision and the 
Supreme Court of Canada Baker decision.
The recent British Columbia Court of Appeal decision Auton v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General) (2002) addressed the dual applicability of the Charter and the Convention in 
the case of children with autism denied state-funded health services particular to their condition. 
The Court clearly acknowledged in that decision that the Charter does apply to children. Section 
15 of the Charter establishes equality rights for Canadians. Section 15(1) states:
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without 
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental 
or physical disability.
In her decision. Madam Justice Saunders for the Court of Appeal emphasized that “age” 
is one of the enumerated items in that section of the Charter, thereby suggesting that section 15 
has direct applicability to children. The Court held that the “Convention has moral force relevant 
on an assessment of whether there is a Charter v io lation.. .  even though it is an international 
commitment by Canada and the impugned measure is a subject area within provincial 
constitutional competence” (paragraph 63).
In the case of Baker v. Canada (Minister o f  Citizenship and Immigration) (1999), the 
Supreme Court of Canada directly addressed the status of the Convention in Canadian law. This 
case was an appeal from a woman with Canadian-born children who had been ordered deported.
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She was seeking an exemption from deportation on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 
One of the issues before the Court was whether the immigration authorities were under an 
obligation to give primary consideration to the children’s best interests given the absence in the 
federal immigration legislation of reference to the Convention. The Convention outlines the 
paramountcy of children’s best interests in states’ decisions. The majority of the Court held that 
the children’s interests and rights were central humanitarian and compassionate values in 
Canadian society. The Court stated that because the Convention has not been implemented by 
statute, it has no direct application in Canadian law; nevertheless, the values reflected in 
international human rights conventions inform the context for statutory interpretation and judicial 
review. Legislatures are presumed to respect the values and principles of international treatises 
such as the Convention. As such, this international document provides value-based context for 
statutory law in Canada.
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Chapter Three: British Columbia Child Protection Legislative Scheme 
This chapter outlines the historical context and background of the current British 
Columbia child protection legislation. It also contains an overview of the current provincial 
child protection legislation, the Child, Family and Community Service Act (1996).
Background o f the Legislation 
An important part of the history of legal treatment of children in the British common law 
was the first industrial revolution between the late 1700s and early 1800s during which time 
children in Britain and the colonies were treated as a type of mini-adult who could provide cheap 
labour (Denney, 1998). Gradually, wide scale exploitation of children in Europe and the colonies 
led to a realization for the need to put into place special protections for children. According to 
Swift (1995), the first time protection of children was legislated in Canada was during settlement 
years when a number of children were being either orphaned or abandoned. The first Canadian 
child welfare legislation was the 1779 Act to Provide fo r  the Education and Support o f  Orphaned 
Children in Upper Canada (Melichercik, 1995). Toward the end of the nineteenth century in 
Canada, children began to be viewed quite distinctly from adults and as needing special 
protections (Macintyre, 1993). According to Macintyre (1993), this development coincided with 
a trend toward urban-based nuclear families, with distinctive mother and father roles, with 
mothers also being viewed as economically dependent. The first legislation in the province of 
British Columbia focused on child welfare was the Infants Act enacted in 1901 ; during that time, 
children’s aid societies formed in urban areas to care for orphaned and neglected children. The 
Infants Act was amended in 1934 to provide for prevention, and the provincial Child Welfare 
Division formed in 1935 to take over care of children from children’s aid societies (Gove, 1995). 
In the early 1970s, the government established community resource boards which brought
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planning and some decision-making to local levels, but this trend came to an end in 1975 with 
the election of the Social Credit government, a government which advocated centralization as a 
cost-saving measure (Gove, 1995). Justice Thomas Berger led a Royal Commission on Family 
and Children’s Law in 1973. His ideas, most of which were not implemented by the Social 
Credit government, included the ambit of legal recognition of children’s rights; creation of family 
advocate lawyers to represent children in court; unified family court; multi-disciplinary child 
abuse teams; family support services; narrower grounds of apprehension; and voluntary custody 
agreements (Royal Commission, 1976). Among these specific recommendations which have 
never since been implemented are:
1. Judges appointed to the provincial and supreme courts (family division) should have 
special interest and aptitude for cases involving families and children;
2. There be family advocates appointed in each justice region where practicable, to serve 
the whole province;
3. There are family and juvenile court committees with accountability powers appointed 
by municipal councils;
4. There should be legislation enacted to include a statement of children’s rights.
The Social Credit government introduced the Family and Child Service Act in 1981 (Gove 1995), 
legislation which did not incorporate these recommendations of the Berger Commission.
The current Child, Family and Community Service Act was enacted in 1996 under New 
Democratic Party British Columbia leadership to replace the Family and Child Service Act. This 
legislation came into effect in the aftermath of and in partial response to Judge Gove’s 1995 
comprehensive review of the state of child protection in British Columbia. At the finality of his 
review in 1995, Judge Thomas J. Gove produced the Gove Report. The full title of the report is.
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Report o f  the Gove Inquiry into Child Protection in British Columbia: A  Commission o f Inquiry 
into the adequacy o f  the services, policies and practices o f  the Ministry o f  Social Services as they 
relate to the apparent neglect, abuse and death o f Matthew John Vaudreuil. At the age of 5 
years old, Matthew died of asphyxia while in his mother’s care. He was the victim of serious 
abuse including torture before his untimely death. There had been at least sixty reports to the 
Ministry about his well-being prior to his death, and he had been involved with at least twenty 
social workers at various times who were part of the then Ministry of Social Services. The 
overall conclusion of Gove’s commission of inquiry was that “serious inadequacies in the 
ministry’s child protection system, and in the provision of child protection services by ministry 
social workers, contributed to M atthew’s suffering and death” (Gove, 1995, Vol. 1, p. 1).
In calling for substantial reform to the child protection services that existed in British 
Columbia at the time of Matthew John Vaudreuil’s death, the Gove Report contains 118 
recommendations for change. These recommendations addressed the following thematic areas: 
how the ministry protects children; death and injury reviews; qualifications of service providers; 
the legislation; and designing a new child welfare system.
Overview o f  the Current Legislation
Fragmentation and a lack of a unified legislative and policy approach characterize 
children’s services and public treatment of children’s rights in Canada (Tang et al., 1999; Swift 
1995). The variation of services across the country arises from the constitutional federal / 
provincial division of government areas of jurisdiction. Child welfare is an area of provincial 
responsibility; therefore, legislative responses vary from province to province. As a partial 
solution to this issue in British Columbia, the Gove Report (1995) recommended that all child 
welfare services of the provincial government be brought together into one ministry -  the
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Ministry of Children and Family Development was formed subsequent to this recommendation 
no. 106 of the Gove Report (1995).
As stated, the current British Columbia Child, Family and Community Service Act was 
enacted in 1996, the same year as the creation of the new children and families’ ministry. The 
stated legislative attempt at the time was to respond to many of the Gove Report 
recommendations (British Columbia Ministry of Social Services, 1996). A significant shift in 
this legislation (versus the predecessor legislation) is the stated focus on the safety and well­
being of children as paramount; the prior legislation had focused more on a family-centered 
approach. Part 1 of the current Child, Family and Community Service Act contains the 
introductory provisions including definitions. Part 2 is about family support services, youth and 
transitional support services and agreements. Part 3 is the largest part of the legislation; it is 
divided into seven divisions which outline technical procedures relating to child protection: 
responding to reports; cooperative planning and dispute resolution; how children are protected; 
child protection hearings and orders; continuing custody hearings and orders; related orders; and 
procedure and evidence. Part 4 is about children in care. Part 5 is confidentiality and disclosure 
of information. Part 6 outlines appeals and reviews. Part 7 relates to administration and the last 
two parts are miscellaneous and transitional provisions.
Both the Gove Report (1995) and the British Columbia Ombudsman (1998) noted that the 
enactment of this new Act was important to help bring the child welfare legislation more into line 
with the Convention. Some but not all of the Gove Report legislative recommendations were 
included in this new Act. Table 3.1 contains a breakdown of the status of implementation of the 
Gove Report recommendations in the legislation, identified by the British Columbia Ombudsman 
in 1998 and still accurate at date of writing.
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Table 3.1
Implementation Status o f the Gove Report Recommendations that Relate to the British Columbia 
Child, Family and Community Service Act.
[Information included in brackets refers to changes made between 1998 and date of writing. Table continues onto
Gove Report Recommendation Status of implementation & British Columbia 
Ombudsman’s comments
Recommendation 36: Strengthen the role o f the child 
advocate by clearly stating in legislation the role -  that it 
relates to all children in the province receiving child- 
related services & authority to appoint legal counsel.
Partly implemented due to establishment of Children’s 
Commission & Office of Child, Youth and Family 
Advocate [since abolished]. The Ombudsman called for 
more resources to be provided to these two advocacy 
offices.
Recommendation 39: Children, parents & caregivers 
affected by administrative decisions need consistent, 
accessible complaints process headed by recognized 
review bodies & persons affected need to be informed of 
right to review of the process.
Partly implemented due to wording o f Section 70 which 
provides information about and assistance with 
contacting Child, Youth and Family Advocate [since 
abolished]. The Ombudsman recommended 
development o f a public plan to explain how children in 
care could access independent advocacy.
Recommendation 68: Rephrase wording o f section 2 to 
state that safety & well-being of child shall be paramount 
considerations.
Fully implemented.
Recommendation 69: The Act should be amended to 
state the right of children to early determination of 
decisions relating to them is paramount and the onus is 
on any other party to show its interests should take 
priority over the child’s.
Not implemented.
Recommendation 70: initial temporary care order for 
children under 5 years should last up to 6 months.
Not implemented.
Recommendation 72: The Act should provide that 
director can bring case to court by way of summons.
Fully implemented.
Recommendation 74: there should be notice and 
consultation rights for any child capable o f forming 
views & to allow a child to make access application to 
parent or foster child.
Not implemented. Committed & work in progress.
Recommendation 73: should be made clear director can 
in limited circumstances, retain control o f child’s care 
while leaving child in the home.
Fully implemented.
Recommendation 75: The Act should provide that 
children & youth capable o f forming own views be 
informed o f important administrative & judicial process 
affecting them & be given the opportunity to express 
their views. It should include right to attend court & 
other proceedings affecting them.
Not implemented -  the statutory provisions fall short of 
Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child
Recommendation 76: there should be appeals from 
Provincial Court directly to the Court o f Appeal.
Not implemented -  Ombudsman disagrees with this 
recommendation.
Recommendations 77(a) & (b): Define aboriginal 
ancestry so the ministry will know who to notify & 
recommendation & the issue o f aboriginal ancestry 
should be canvassed early in proceeding for purpose of 
certainty around notice to Aboriginal community.
Not implemented -  this term aboriginal ancestry is 
vague and uncertain.
Recommendation 79: The circumstances o f emotional Not implemented.
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harm as ground o f protection should be amended to 
include likely to be harmed by parents’ conduct.
Recommendation 80: Section 16 o f the Act should 
require an initial investigation o f child’s need for 
protection in response to initial report.
Not implemented -  the Director need only assess 
information received.
Recommendation 81: The director should be required to 
make reasonable efforts to report results o f initial & 
subsequent investigations to parent, reporting person and 
other involved bodies.
Fully implemented.
Recommendation 82: There should be new section to 
allow for third party applications for child to be 
removed.
Not implemented.
Recommendation 83: The threshold belief a director 
must form before obtaining an order for access to an 
endangered child should be eliminated.
Not implemented -  viewed by the Ombudsman as 
unnecessary.
Recommendation 84: The Act should provide that 
director can seek court order to produce information 
necessary for director’s investigation.
Not implemented.
Recommendation 85: the use of family conference 
should be discretionary on the part o f the director.
Fully implemented.
Recommendation 86: time limits around family 
conferences should be removed & criteria for decision to 
refer to family conference should be when child’s safety 
has been ensured & family could benefit from family 
support services or other child welfare services.
Not implemented.
Recommendation 88: Caregivers including foster 
parents who have custody for 6 months or longer should 
receive minimum 72 hours notice before custody 
transferred.
Not implemented in the legislation -  occurs by policy or 
agreement.
Recommendation 89: the 30 day time limit on when the 
director can apply for continuing custody should be 
replaced with 60 days at least.
Fully implemented.
Recommendation 91 : Court review o f director’s 
decision to withdraw should be legitimized by director 
filing report or allowing court to question withdrawal of 
a case.
Not implemented.
Source: Ombudsman British Columbia (1998). Public report no. 36. Getting there : A review o f  the 
implementation o f  the report o f  the Gove inquiry into child protection. Victoria : Ombudsman British Columbia.
Therefore, the British Columbia Ombudsman’s (1998) findings about implementation of 
the Gove recommendations are mixed. It is interesting to note that many of the 
recommendations that directly address children’s specific human rights have not been 
implemented by the provincial government, in particular, concerning children’s right to 
participate in decisions affecting their lives. This continuing gap in implementation has 
significant implications for the status of children’s rights in the province.
36
The Gove Report (1995) went beyond the scope of the legislation and contained 
comments on the entirety of the British Columbia child protection scheme. In addition, the Gove 
Report includes specific recommendations calling for the establishment of both a provincial child 
advocate and a children’s commission. The New Democratic government of the time 
implemented these measures; however, under the current British Columbia Liberal government, 
both offices have been abolished and replaced with the Office of Children and Youth with a 
much narrower mandate than what the Gove Report recommendations called for in terms of child 
advocacy measures. These recommendations were intended to dovetail with and complement an 
improved complaints process relating to the M inistry’s administrative decisions.
The current provincial Liberal government’s policy statement (British Columbia, 2002) is 
to decentralize the administration of child welfare services including child protection throughout 
the province. This process will involve designation of regional boards and specific Aboriginal 
agencies to administer child protection services. The Community Services Interim Authorities 
Act, Bill 65 - 2002, reached third reading on October 29, 2002, in the Provincial Legislature. The 
devolution of services has not occurred yet as of date of writing. The fiscal arrangements for this 
devolution of services have not yet been finalized.
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Chapter Four: Central Concepts in the British Columbia Child Protection Legislation within the
Context of Human Rights
Various provincial Acts in British Columbia pertain to aspects of child welfare, but to 
date of writing, no one Act addresses “child welfare” as a holistic concept within the province. 
As stated, the Child, Family and Community Service Act is the piece of legislation that governs 
child protection services in the province of British Columbia. This law sets out the provincial 
government’s responsibility for administering defined child welfare services including child 
protection and sets the parameters under which this particular area of service delivery transpires. 
This chapter outlines the central legal concepts in the British Columbia child protection 
legislation and the relationship of these concepts to children’s rights.
Parens Patriae
Although the Child, Family and Community Service Act does not expressly include the 
term parens patriae, it is a defining aspect of this legislation; the Act has roots in this historical 
legal notion. Parens patriae, or “the state as parent,” arises out of the common law (judge-made 
law) with a history dating back to the law courts of England. As such, it is a legal concept with 
an entirely different legal history than individualistic-based human rights. This term is central 
to and gives justification for any Canadian or provincial statute that relates to children or any 
other individuals with what is considered to be a legal handicap. It is a concept heavy with 
paternalistic overtones.
In the case of E. (Mrs.) v. Eve (1986), the Supreme Court of Canada specifically 
examined the history of the parens patriae doctrine in Canada. The concept’s origins are, 
according to the Court (quoting from H. Theobald, The Law Relating to Lunacy 1924), “lost in 
the mists of antiquity” but it is most probable that this legal principle gained substance during
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feudal times in England. The Supreme Court of Court cited the British case of Wellesley v. Duke 
o f Beaufort (1827), and the following quote of Lord Eldon, then Lord Chancellor, for that Court: 
it belongs to the King as parens patriae, having the care of those who are not able to take 
care of themselves, and is founded on the obvious necessity that the law should place 
somewhere the care of individuals who cannot take care of themselves, particularly in 
cases where it is clear that some care should be thrown round them" (p. 243).
What is interesting in the wording of this case is a presumed understanding of the notion of 
“care;” there is in this case dating back to the early 1800s the basis of contemporary legal 
discourse around that matter.
In a more recent British case cited by and relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada, Re 
X  (a minor) (1975), Justice Latey discussed the wide breadth of the parens patriae doctrine:
the powers of the court in this particular jurisdiction have always been described as being 
of the widest nature. That the courts are available to protect children from injury 
whenever they properly can is no modem development.
On appeal from this same case, the British Court of Appeal did not dispute this description of 
parens patriae but only added the idea that there should be incorporated some limitations to its 
scope. In the words of Sir John Pennycuick as quoted by the Supreme Court of Canada in E. 
(Mrs.) V. Eve (1986):
...the courts, when exercising the parental power of the Crown, have, at any rate in legal 
theory, an unrestricted jurisdiction to do whatever is considered necessary for the welfare 
of a ward. It is, however, obvious that far-reaching limitations in principle on the exercise 
of this jurisdiction must exist. The jurisdiction is habitually exercised within those 
limitations. . . .Latey J's statement of the law is I think correct, but he does not lay
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sufficient emphasis on the limitations with which the courts should exercise this 
jurisdiction.
In the Supreme Court of Canada decision, Winnipeg Child & Family Services v. W. (K.L.) 
(2000), Madame Justice Arbour in dissent commented that although the parens patriae tradition 
provides government child welfare agencies jurisdiction over children to protect them from harm, 
this power must be balanced in a democratic society, with “ensuring that state actors cannot 
remove children from their parents’ care without legal grounds” (p. 139).
Parens patriae jurisdiction lies with both the Crown and the superior courts. The Crown 
in Canada takes the form of federal and provincial levels of government. According to Hogg 
(1992), the British North America Act, 1867, the basis for the Canadian Constitution, provides 
for general executive authority in Canada to vest with the Queen (the Queen of England) with 
specific powers granted to the Governor General. Therefore, the Canadian voted Members of 
Parliament and of the provincial legislatures technically have an advisory role for the Crown.
The legislative arm of government comprises the Crown (as represented by the Governor General 
federally and the Lieutenant Governor provincially) in council with the elected ministers. Only 
this branch of the Crown can make laws (statutes and regulations) in Canada. The executive, that 
is the government bureaucracy, is also a part of the Crown, responsible for administration of the 
Crown’s responsibilities pursuant to the legislative body’s delegation. According to the doctrine 
of “parliamentary sovereignty” under which Parliament and the provincial legislatures act, there 
is no limit on the powers that can be delegated to the executive branches (Jones & Villars, 1994).
The parens patriae jurisdiction not only vests in both branches of government but also 
rests with the Supreme Court judiciary. Section 96 of the Canadian Constitution establishes that 
the Governor General of Canada appoints judges of the provinces’ superior courts (in British
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Columbia, the British Columbia Supreme Court and British Columbia Court of Appeal). As 
provincial courts assume their jurisdiction from provincial statute, they do not inherently possess 
parens paM ag jurisdiction; however, much provincial legislation including the Child, Family 
and Community Service Act are informed by this doctrine.
Canadian courts have established that the extent to which children’s views are considered 
in the realm of family law is dependent on their level of capacity. The determination of capacity 
is an entirely discretionary matter and hinges on judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis; 
therefore, it is a matter far from being definitively determined by the courts. In the case of 
Alexander v. Alexander (1988), Mr. Justice Locke for the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
stated, “What the child wishes is not necessarily best for the child, but there does come a point 
when at near adult years a child capable of responsible thought must now be deemed to be able to 
settle his own future in this important matter [i.e. custody with one parent or another].” In other 
words, the courts have discretion to determine that the best interests of the child lie completely 
elsewhere from the views of the child. In the case of Dove v. Dove (2002), Justice Edwards of the 
British Columbia Supreme Court summarized the state of the law concerning young children’s 
input into custody and access decisions:
The preference of a child of nine may be given some weight but it is not determinative. It 
is a matter of discretion as to whether the court takes the views of any child into account. 
The court is not bound by the preference of a child where it appears the best interest of 
the child lies in granting custody elsewhere (paragraph 42).
In terms of Fraser’s (1989) discussion of the discursive resources in western society 
leading to domination and subordination, the law and legal tradition are centrally recognized 
idioms in our society for pressing claims, and such claims must fit within this existing framework
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and connect to recognized legal language if even awkwardly. Such appears to be the case with 
emerging children’s rights and their treatment within the legal landscape influenced by parens 
patriae and the dependent position of children in society. “Rights” language by Fraser’s (1989) 
understanding, is a particular vocabulary, and the notion of competing rights is a “paradigm of 
argument” as described by Fraser (1989, p. 164), but so too is state “protection” of children and 
the legal doctrine of parens patriae. Here in exists a profound tension. Law narratively 
constructs individuals’ placement in society and as such, positions individuals and groups of 
individuals in relation to each other. In this regard, children have historically assumed a 
paradoxical role of not only legal insignificance on the personal level - the issue of limited 
capacity rendering them less than full persons before the law - but also worthiness to receive the 
fullest paternalistic protection afforded by the law.
Protection
Section 2 of the British Columbia Child, Family and Community Service Act states that, 
“children are entitled to be protected [emphasis added] from abuse, neglect and harm.” The 
concept of protection is another term not defined in this piece of legislation, but from the 
wording of the provisions of the Act, underlying assumptions about the meaning of the word 
become apparent.
Consistent with the doctrine of parens patriae, “protection” in the context of this 
legislation assumes state-administered protection as an opposed to family care of the child. 
Section 13 of the Act is subtitled “When protection is needed,” and the wording sets out that 
protection is akin to the state taking over from the parent/s when a delegate of the Director (a 
child protection social worker) believes there is a shortcoming on the part of the parent/s:
A child needs protection in the following circumstances:
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(a) if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed by the child’s parent;
(b) if the child has been, or is likely to be, sexually abused or exploited by the child’s 
parent;
(c) if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed, sexually abused or sexually 
exploited by another person and if the child’s parent is unwilling or unable [emphasis 
added] to protect the child;
(d) if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed because of neglect 
[emphasis added] by the child’s parent;
(e) if the child is emotionally harmed by the parent’s conduct;
(f) if the child is deprived of necessary health care;
(g) if the child’s development is likely to be seriously impaired by a treatable condition 
and the child’s parent refuses to provide or consent to treatment;
(h) if the child’s parent is unable [emphasis added] or unwilling to care for the child and 
has not made adequate provision for the child’s care [emphasis added]. . .
This section does not set up a cooperative role of the state with the parent or parents in 
these circumstances, but rather, presupposes an adversarial context. The underlined words refer 
to situations where for whatever reason, the Director or delegates may believe protection is 
needed merely because a parent lacks resources or capacity needed to adequately provide for a 
child. In such discretionary cases, the Act provides for this state-administered and decided 
version of protection to come into effect. This wording has definite implications for single 
mothers in particular, who tend to head lower income families and who also make up a larger 
proportion of protection investigation “clients” (Swift, 1995).
As outlined previously, the British Columbia government reports that over fifty percent of
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children taken into care come from single parent families and approximately sixty-five to seventy 
percent are from families on income assistance (British Columbia Ministry of Children and 
Family Development, 2002). In addition, “many” of these children have fragile medical concerns 
and special needs (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2002). The 
implication is that children from lower income brackets, particularly those requiring services 
their parents may not be able to afford, appear to be more susceptible to protection proceedings. 
The underlying assumption of this legislative provision therefore, is that the state is better 
situated to provide “protection” than a parent or caregiver is in the circumstances enumerated in 
the Act. This assumption proves interesting and arguably inconsistent with other areas of family 
law in which the law emphasizes the paramountcy of parental nurturing and parental 
responsibility to address the child’s well-being and best interests.
The inherent tension between the legislative concept of “proteetion” and parental or 
caregiver nurture also shows up in case law. Canadian courts have interpreted the notion of 
“protection” in a way that is consistent with the state intrusion meaning of the word outlined in 
the British Columbia legislation. In the Supreme Court of Canada decision, Winnipeg Child & 
Family Services (Central Area) v. W. (K.L.) (2000), although Madame Justice Arbour in dissent 
acknowledged the importance of family in a child’s life, she clearly differentiated the notion of 
protection: “In my view, not only should the Court recognize the child’s interest in being 
protected from harm [emphasis added], but we must also recognize the interest of a child in 
being nurtured and brought up by his or her parent” (p. 138). While the Court emphasized the 
importance of nurture. Justice Arbour also distinguished the word “protection” from parental 
nurture. In another Supreme Court of Canada decision, Winnipeg Child & Family Services 
(Northwest Area) v. G. (D.F.) (1997), the Court held, “child protection involves state
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intervention [emphasis added] in complex and interdependent relationships. These family 
situations often lack clear heroes or villains” (paragraph 5). Although these court decisions 
reflect the legislative distinction between “protection” and parental or caregiver nurture, they also 
hint at the wording of the Convention more than does the current wording of the British 
Columbia child protection legislation. These judicial pronouncements do not preclude a 
supportive role of government to caregivers in bringing about enhanced protection of children.
Of course, the courts only go so far in this regard. Their role is not to create social policy but 
only to comment on existing government legislative approaches and to determine whether they 
comply with established Canadian law.
Absent from the British Columbia legislative wording is a notion of an “ethic of care” 
(Gilligan, 1982). According to Moore (1999), this ethic rests on “an alternative moral outlook 
distinct from the impartial perspective. [T]he central preoccupation of a morality of c a re .. .  is 
responsiveness to others, exemplified by concern to provide care, prevent harm, and maintain 
relationships with others” (p. 2). The legislation also lacks a more comprehensive definition of 
protection. “Protection” as legislatively constructed, has more to do with the superiority of state- 
administered care for children than caregiver or parental nurturing. This same assumption further 
implies that the statutory list of potential shortcomings in the care of a child do not attach to the 
state or state-administered versions of care. In other words, there is no provision in the 
legislation providing for “protection” of children from child protection. This gap proves 
intriguing when taken together with other gaps in the legislation that I will discuss.
The wording of this section also contrasts in some interesting ways with the use of the 
word “protective” in Article 19(2) of the Convention. That article states, “Protective measures 
should, as appropriate, include effective procedures for the establishment of social programmes
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to provide necessary support [emphasis added] for the child and for those who have the care of 
the child.” In other words, the Convention envisions a different conceptualization of 
“protection” than how this term is presented in the Child, Family and Community Service Act 
with the Convention’s focus on “support.” Although there is provision for family supports to be 
provided to families on the discretion of the Director under the British Columbia legislation, 
none of these “support” clauses specifically describe family supports by the government as a 
viable means of protection.
In response to Canadian child welfare public policy trends, Pulkingham and Temowetsky
(1997) argue, “protection is actually performed by women in the private sphere of the family . .  . 
mothers are not written into the protection mandate explicitly .. . State intervention in the guise 
of ‘relief for the family’ typically involves little respite for mothers who are given minimal 
material and other supports in taking on this role for the state” (p. 27). The legislation constructs 
child protection as a runaway need in that it has fled the domestic realm and entered the “social 
arena,” leading to “noncoincidence with the family” (Fraser, 1989, p. 109); therefore, in terms of 
the wording of the Convention and critical consideration, the legislated definition of protection is 
lacking.
Safety and Well-Being
The guiding principles of the Child, Family and Community Service Act are set out in 
Section 2. The first part of the section refers to the “safety” and “well-being” of children being 
paramount considerations. The inclusion of these concepts in the legislation followed 
recommendation no. 68 in the Gove Report (1995) which called for such rewording. Neither 
term is specifically defined in this legislation but both track the wording contained in the 
Convention. Article 3(2) of the Convention includes the word “well-being,” undefined, and
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Article 3(3) mentions the child’s safety as being a concern in the provision of State services.
Section 2 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act also outlines that, “the family 
is the preferred environment for the care and upbringing of children and the responsibility for the 
protection of children rests primarily with the parents.” This aspect of the legislation explicitly 
places an onus on the family to be the primary caregiver for the child and interestingly, there is 
here no corresponding mention of familial rights. Such wording contrasts with the wording 
included in the Convention. Article 3(2) of the Convention states, “State Parties undertake to 
ensure the child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into 
account the rights and duties of his or her parents.” Whereas previous British Columbia 
legislation had more of a familial context (Gove, 1995), the current British Columbia child 
protection legislation does not so clearly identify that parents have definite rights in relation to 
parenting their children. The Gove Report (1995) called for a clear statement to be included in 
the legislation that would put children first; this report did not go as far as to examine more 
holistic aspects of child welfare. The focus of the Gove Report (1995) was a more formal 
legalistic understanding of children’s rights as distinct from parents’. Canadian courts’ 
consideration of the matter elaborates further on parental rights; however, in the child protection 
context, the courts have not yet outrightly tied parental rights to children’s well-being, as 
provided for in the Convention.
In one Supreme Court of Canada decision however, the Court identified parental interest 
in raising a child as a right of fundamental importance worthy of Charter protection. In the case 
of New Brunswick (Ministry o f Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.) (1999), three of seven 
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the right set out in Section 7 of the Canadian 
Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms extends to psychological integrity, and they found an
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infringement of this right in the context of a child protection proceedings on the part of the 
parent. The Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms is part of the Canadian Constitution and Section 7 
of the Charter establishes the following constitutional right:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
In the New Brunswick decision, Chief Justice Lamer stated:
State removal of a child from parental custody pursuant to the state’s parens patriae 
jurisdiction constitutes a serious interference with the psychological integrity of the 
parent. The parental interest in raising and caring for a child is, as La Forest J. held in 
B.(R.), [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 at paragraph 83, an individual interest of fundamental 
importance in our society.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Canada here focused on the parent’s right rather than 
the apprehended child’s; furthermore, there is no mention that the child’s well-being attaches 
primarily to parental care. In taking this approach of describing parental rights as a type of stand­
alone right, the Court provides the context for a competitive notion of rights to prevail within the 
child protection context, that is, parent versus child. Although the Court’s focus is not on the 
child’s rights, Bala (2000) observes that this case dramatically changes judicial approach to 
family law with the consideration of constitutionally-based rights for parents. This judicial 
approach has two-fold potential implications: on the one hand, it could further develop to 
encompass children’s rights in the future; on the other hand, a focus on separate and distinctive 
parental rights invites continued emphasis on legalistic measures such as rigid timeframes, 
complex processes and emphasis on law courts as the most appropriate arbiter in eases involving 
children.
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In an earlier case, the Supreme Court of Canada had hinted at extending the section 7 
Charter constitutional right in a child protection context to the child too; however, it was not a 
decisive statement. The case was B.(R-) v. Children’s A id  Society o f Metropolitan Toronto 
(1995). The facts of this case involved the parent's refusal to consent to a blood transfusion for 
their child. Four of the nine Supreme Court of Canada justices confirmed parental rights 
including the right to nurture the child, care for its development and make decisions regarding 
fundamental matters such as medical care. The State should only be permitted to interfere in that 
realm when parents’ conduct falls below a socially acceptable threshold. Justices lacobucci,
Cory and Major acknowledged that parents have a right to nurture a child, care for his or her 
development and make decisions about fundamental matters; however, these parental rights 
cannot override children’s rights to life and security of person. In the B.(R.) case however, the 
Court’s analysis of children’s rights according to Bala (2000) could potentially mean that 
designates of the State could use children’s rights as a way to limit parents’ rights. The child, 
deemed incapable at law of articulating a sound view on what his or her rights should be, would 
be excluded from participating in decisions about his or her life. Absent then from the Court’s 
consideration of parents’ and children’s potentially contradictory rights is an examination of 
whether the State’s perspective will always accord with the child’s rights and if there is a 
question in that regard, what then is the child’s recourse? The Court makes the assumption in 
this case that a child subject to protection proceedings orchestrated by the State will have no 
rights concerns vis-à-vis the State. In addition, to date, the law conceives rights as a type of 
either / or proposition, reflecting the historic treatment of rights in the legal system. Rights 
according to this perspective then, become a matter of black and white, in essence, legally pitting 
parent against child.
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Best Interests o f  the Child
Howe (2002) suggests that with the ratification of the Convention, public policy across 
Canada moved away from “centering on the family to one centering on the best interests of the 
child” (p. 370) and nowhere was this clearer than in British Columbia. Running through the 
British Columbia law relating to children including the Child, Family and Community Service 
A ct is this cornerstone concept; it is another concept central to the law relating to children in 
Canada. It is dually influenced by parens patriae and emerging child rights discourse. Section 
4(1) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act states,
Where there is a reference in this Act to the best interests of a child, all relevant factors
must be considered in determining the child’s best interests, including for example:
a) the child’s safety;
b) the child’s physical and emotional needs and level of development;
c) the importance of continuity in the child’s care;
d) the quality of the relationship the child has with a parent or other person and the effect
of maintaining that relationship;
e) the child’s cultural, linguistic and religious heritage;
f) the child’s views;
g) the effect on the child if there is delay in making a decision.
Taken one step further, this best interests provision in the British Columbia Child, Family 
and Community Service Act is only as strong as corresponding provisions and measures that 
address implementation and enforcement. What is lacking from the British Columbia legislation 
is a provision that would assure how the child’s views in this context will be advanced and 
considered. In addition, all parts of this stated best interests test are discretionary, meaning that
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at first instance, the arbiter of what best interests means in a given situation is the MCFD 
Director and delegates (the social workers) and at the second level, the courts. A great deal of 
discretion therefore rests with a provincial court judge to determine best interests of the child in 
child protection matters. Child protection determinations fall within the jurisdiction of the 
provincial court.
On its face, the provincial child protection legislation is consistent with the Convention in 
regard to the inclusion of the best interests principle. The Act goes one step further in terms of 
specificity. What the Act does that the Convention does not, is to provide some parameters 
around what the “best interests” concept means. Article 3(1) of the Convention provides, “In all 
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests [emphasis added] 
of the child shall be a primary consideration.” Further, Article 9(1) establishes a child shall only 
be separated from parents “when competent authorities subject to judicial review determ ine.. .  
that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child.”
Parker (1994) identifies that the concept of best interests in and of itself, is a subjective 
matter: “the likelihood of any single meaning being adopted by a decision-maker, can depend in 
large part on localized understandings or conventions” (p. 39). Similarly, A lston’s (1994) view 
is that the concept of “best interests” needs to maintain such an element of indeterminacy (p. 18); 
this writer points out how its inclusion in the Convention is subject to criticism for this very 
reason (p. 18). In 1975, Mnookin critiqued the “best interests” principle for being indeterminate 
and commented that there is no consensus on identifying the values that inform the concept; 
according to Mnookin (1975), the resulting problem of this indeterminacy is that it is more 
difficult to pinpoint allocation of responsibility between family and State for children’s best
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interests. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, the evolving common law indicates that in the 
Canadian courts too, the “best interests of the child” is increasingly understood as an articulation 
of children’s rights.
In Canadian law, the “best interests” principle has broad applicability in any law 
pertaining to children. For instance, in family custody and access court disputes, whether or not 
the state is involved, judicial determination regarding children’s situations within family contexts 
will hinge on what is determined to be in their best interest. In the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision Gordon v. Goertz (1996) for instance, the Court held that in assessing custody and 
access arrangements, the focus will be on the child’s interests and not the parents’ interests and 
rights. The Court specifically considered the “best interests” test. They referred to this test as 
being “indeterminate” and a type of “legal aspiration” rather than strict “legal analysis” (p. 192). 
The court cautioned that the essence of “best interests” requires an element of indeterminacy 
because any other more definitive and precise approach to assessing the situation of a child 
would run the risk of seconding the child’s interests to concerns such as certainty and 
expediency. According to Canada’s highest court then, the multitude of factors relating to a 
child’s situation requires an element of indeterminacy. With such indeterminacy, comes a broad 
scope for judicial discretion on an individual case-by-case basis to determine what is, on the 
particular facts at hand, in the child’s best interests.
Boyd (2000) critiques the Gordon decision as opening the door to potentially 
“contradictory” and “problematic” judicial understanding of best interests (p. 175). Canada’s 
highest court’s acceptance of a central role for judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis suggests 
a view of the “best interests” concept that is reflective of the parens patriae  inspired role of the 
court to assume a quasi-parental role as considered necessary. The discussed wording of Section
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4(1) of the Child, Family and Community Service Act could be open to comparable “state” 
discretion, both on the part of the director and delegates operating under the legislation and on 
the part of the courts. For instance, the “child’s physical and emotional needs” is a concept 
providing for a certain amount of discretion : who precisely determines what a child needs and 
on what basis? Similarly, the “quality” of a child’s relationships is also very much open to 
subjective determination. What exactly constitutes quality and who will determine that is not set 
out. Therefore, a great deal of subjectivity and room for interpretation attaches to the concept of 
“best interests” at both the British Columbia legislative and judicial levels of the law. In these 
ways, through both legislative wording and judicial discretion, the “best interests” standard raises 
questions about how the doctrine of parens patriae will inform child rights discourse in 
Canadian law into the future.
In the prior case of Young v. Young (1993), the Supreme Court of Canada had also 
emphasized the centrality of the “best interests of the child” in custody determinations. Justice 
L ’Heureux-Dubé specifically focused on the children’s rights within the family context as 
inherent in the best interests standard when she held as follows:
The power of a custodial parent is not a ‘right’ with independent value granted by courts 
for the benefit of the parent. Rather, the child has a right to a parent who will look after 
his or her best interests and the custodial parent a duty to ensure, protect and promote the 
child’s best interests. The duty includes the sole and primary responsibility to oversee all 
aspects of day-to-day life and long-term well-being, as well as major decisions with 
respect to education, religion, health and well-being (p. 6).
An interesting aspect of this judgment is how it seems to pit the child’s rights or best interest 
against the parent’s rights. Young (2001) suggests that this case was driven “less by the interests
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of the child and more by the notion of parental rights that in effect require dividing the child 
equally” (pp. 770-771), and to settle the parents’ competing rights as against each other, the 
Court gave paramountcy to the child’s right to effective parental care.
Young (2001) maintains that in Canadian jurisprudence, one can find a developing 
tradition of a rights culture within the realm of family law. Interestingly, this notion of the 
child’s rights in the context of family has not yet been so forcefully articulated by the courts in 
the realm of child welfare, specifically in cases involving child protection and apprehension of 
the child from the family setting. To date it appears that judicial discourse concerning child 
protection matters regardless of the stated best interests principle in the legislation, is still more 
consistent with more paternalistic elements of the law that have grown out of the common law.
In describing the best interests test as one of two possible approaches to human rights 
public policy approach, Brennan and Noggle (1997) caution that there are two limitations to the 
concept. The first, they suggest, is that in interpreting the term, judges must have and apply a 
standard of well-being, an approach which does not necessarily put children’s rights per se first. 
Secondly, they suggest the “maximizing nature” of the best interests test can potentially lead to 
more intervention in family life whether or not that intervention is consistent with children’s 
rights. In other words, even perceived small gains for children could lead to increased state 
involvement in their lives. On the other hand, according to this view, it is problematic to treat 
parental rights as property rights such as is the situation in a policy directed at keeping families 
together at all costs. Brennan and Noggle (1997) instead suggest a middle ground approach 
which would treat parental rights as a type of “stewardship” rights in regard to their children’s 
lives, limited only by the children’s rights. This latter approach has merit due to its 
acknowledgement of children’s rights as central and parental rights as supportive and very much
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related to and interdependent with children’s rights.
The significance of the “best interests of the child” statement in the Convention is subject 
to much discussion in the literature on point. W olf (1992) posits that because the term is in the 
Convention, it inherently relates to children’s human rights as is the approach taken by Canadian 
courts (pp. 126, 128). He suggests that the Convention’s wording opens up a new conceptual 
understanding of children’s rights which was previously not supportable in international law 
more focused on special protection for children. Wolfson (1992) views this provision in the 
Convention as “an attempt to articulate and enumerate the practical implications of the [best 
interests of the child] standard” (p. 7).
W olfson’s (1992) view is characteristic of the interest-based position which holds that 
rights represent a means of advancing one’s interests; therefore, only a being with interests can 
hold rights. According to such an interpretation, the articulation of children’s rights very much 
parallels discourse on adults’ human rights. These ideas suggest that “best interests of the child” 
in the Convention is a statement of children’s rights. As stated, the Child, Family and 
Community Service Act goes no further than Section 4 in defining what best interests will be 
taken to mean in the British Columbia child protection context. If “best interests” is indeed a 
paramount statement of children’s rights as suggested by the literature and the development of 
judicial pronouncement in Canadian family law, it should then be taken as a term that 
meaningfully reflects the entirety of children’s rights outlined in the Convention. Missing from 
the Act are legislated supports that would address best interests in terms of the partnership, 
provision and promotion rights of children set out in the Convention. As I will discuss, the 
Convention’s participation rights are weakly addressed in the British Columbia “best interests” 
statement and support mechanisms. Finally, protection rights for children as set out in the
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Convention are defined narrowly in the British Columbia legislation.
The Child’s Family
Krane (1997) suggests that throughout Canada, there is currently a shift away from a 
general concern for the social welfare of children to a narrower emphasis of resource expenditure 
on investigating allegations of abuse and neglect. Although Moroney (1991) looked at American 
trends, his observations can be applied to the British Columbia context. He holds that whereas 
former paradigms of social welfare policy were more proactive and premised on the notion of 
universality, current global trends see a move toward residual social policy. He suggests that on 
its face, contemporary child welfare policy in the family context generally tends to have two 
stated focuses: one being to provide strengthening supports to family; and the second being to 
develop appropriate alternatives to the family where there is a perceived family breakdown. One 
of these focuses may prevail over the other.
Due to the combination of the residual approach and a pervasive western cultural notion 
that the family is a private entity, the focus of child welfare policy in the family realm tends to be 
on “intervention in family life only when necessary . . .  the more appropriate role for the state is 
to become involved only when there is clear evidence of family breakdown” (Moroney, 1991, p. 
141). Similarly, Mclnnis-Dittrich (1994) contends that the “social welfare system is based on the 
assumption that the family and the marketplace should be expected to meet our individual needs 
before we expect help from others or from the government” (p. 7). Such residual focus rests on 
an assumption that in a normal course of events, a family is an independent entity. This trend 
provides an interesting contrast with the potentially broad scope of “protection” measures and 
discretion envisioned by the British Columbia legislation when the family, the presumed 
cornerstone unit of society, is viewed as having broken down. Another challenge to this
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underlying assumption of the residual approach about familial independence is the increasing 
number of children who have been taken into care in British Columbia in recent years.
Also lacking from the residual social policy approach is a failure to go beyond conceiving 
family as an uncomplicated social entity. Such residually based social policy fails to address 
family dynamics including possible internal power differentials and abuses of power that may 
exist within a given family unit. The wording of the British Columbia child protection 
legislation does not at all distinguish between the roles or positions of the parents nor have regard 
for extended family. An exception is a recently enacted clause in the legislation, Section 54.1, 
which provides that the Director or delegate can make application to have a child in care 
permanently placed with someone other than parents. The discretion here rests with the Director 
or delegate to determine whether involvement of the extended family is appropriate. Article 5 of 
the Convention states, “State Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of 
parents, or, where applicable the members of the extended family or community as provided for 
by local custom.” Although this legislation contains specific provision for regard and 
involvement of an Aboriginal child’s community in a child protection proceeding, there is no 
corresponding provision relating to children of other cultural backgrounds whose extended 
families may also be important people in their lives.
The Act’s equal treatment of both parents is consistent with Article 18 of the Convention 
that recognizes, “the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing 
and development of the child.” An assumption therefore of both the provincial Act and the 
Convention is that the child will be part of a nuclear family and that both parents each have 
comparable relationships with the child; however, the number of single parent residences in 
Canada is steadily increasing, from 953,640 in 1991 to 1,137,510 in 1996 (Statistics Canada,
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1996) to 1,311,190 in 2001 (Statistics Canada, 2001). Pulkingham and Temowetsky (1997) 
observe that “children from lone parent families have a much greater chance of being raised in 
poverty” (p. 18). According to Swift (1995), the subjects of child protection investigations 
across Canada, especially neglect cases, are most frequently single mothers and their children. 
This observation is consistent with the reported MCFD statistics indicating that just over thirty 
per cent of protection investigations relate to suspected neglect and over forty five per cent are 
categorized as “multiple types,” a term that is not further defined by the provincial government 
(British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2003a).
The Child, Family and Community Service Act nowhere refers to nor is there provision to 
account specifically for violence or abuse by one parent against the other parent. A history of 
abuse on the part of the other parent with whom the children are not currently living may or may 
not be held to be relevant in the child protection court proceeding, particularly if that history is 
against the other parent and not directly against the child and the parents are now living 
separately. There is no provision in this or any other legislation to provide that additional 
emotional supports will be provided as the protection investigation proceeds, to a parent who 
may have been in receipt of such abusive conduct by the other parent. Callahan (1993a) 
describes how in earlier decades with the emergence of feminism, activist women “addressed 
family violence by establishing alternate social service organizations” and consequently, “activist 
women and their reforms have had little influence on child welfare services” (p. 173). The two 
areas -  violence in relationships and child protection -  are very much separated out from each 
other in the social policy approach of the current provincial government. In addition, the relative 
economic circumstances of the two separated parents may be viewed as a significant factor in a 
child protection proceeding in terms of deciding which parent is in the better financial position to
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provide for the child or children. Due to the wording of Section 13 of the legislation, the 
provision that sets out the child’s need for protection, “inability to provide for the child,” which 
could potentially be interpreted as financial inability, could provide the basis for an apprehension 
and relocation of a child to the wealthier parent or other wealthier family member.
This phenomenon overlaps with current cutbacks to family legal aid coverage in the 
province of British Columbia. The current legal aid system in British Columbia is increasingly 
less than adequate to deal with overarching patterns of social inequity that may exist between two 
parents. In a report into the state of legal aid conducted for the Law Society of British Columbia, 
Trerise (2000) observed,
most of the parents coming before the court to deal with child protection matters are 
women. . . .  often the parent does not get legal advice at the earliest stage of the 
proceeding, which is the Presentation H earing .. .  .the Presentation Hearing must be 
convened within a few days of a child being apprehended, which means that it often 
happens before the parent has applied for legal aid (p. 34).
She further stated;
[there are] numerous observations about the number of unrepresented people in co u rt.. . 
Some lawyers have suggested that women are less equipped than men to appear in court 
unrepresented for a number of reasons.. . far more women than men are refused by legal 
aid. This may support the concern expressed by several lawyers that women are more 
intimidated by the court process and simply will not participate in it without the support 
of counsel. Several interviewees believe that, because of this dynamic, women are 
staying in or returning to bad relationships because they cannot leave without the support 
of the legal system. Others are leaving but slipping into poverty because they do not
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advance their claims for legal rights (p. 35).
With respect to Trerise’s latter comment, recent cutbacks to the legal aid tariff have made it very 
difficult for poorer people to get into court and advance family law claims, particularly if there 
are property division matters outstanding over which only the supreme courts and not the 
provincial courts have jurisdiction. Other than child protection matters, the only persons who 
qualify for family legal aid coverage are those persons who are advancing an allegation of 
violence (British Columbia Legal Services Society, 1999). The implication of this policy is that 
people may feel they need to file child protection complaints against the other parent in order to 
qualify for legal aid coverage. Here then is an example of male-centeredness of the law at the 
level of design of the legal system (McKinnon, 1989).
The number of hours allowed under the child protection legal aid tariff (British Columbia 
Legal Services Society, 1999) is also limited so that at times, there may be insufficient funding 
available to a legal aid lawyer to adequately prepare and present a complete case on behalf of the 
client or to see the matter through to trial due to the capped number of hours available which may 
only provide a lawyer with sufficient funds to act as far as interim proceedings. A capped 
number of hours attach to the lawyer’s various functions in addressing the steps set out in the 
Child, Family and Community Service Act on behalf of a parent client. Trerise (2000) outlines 
that.
Because of the new models of service in the practice of child protection, the Ministry now 
produces reams of documents that counsel must review, and trials tend to be much longer. 
. . lawyers are not given prep time to the level that this work now demands, and there is 
no mechanism to apply for additional hours (p. 34).
The child protection legal aid tariff does however provide more coverage than the general family
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legal aid tariff currently does.
These patterns in the legal system underscore how access to justice currently parallels 
one’s advantaged or disadvantaged position in society and how Fraser’s (1989) view of “patterns 
of domination and subordination” in society get reflected in the legal system. The current Liberal 
government has instituted further cutbacks including closures of courthouses in small towns and 
further clawing back of legal aid availability. Without access to justice and means to enforce 
rights as stated in the laws, rights become no more than stated ideals and lose their tangibility in 
Canadian society. Without realistic means to enforce their rights when threatened, the vulnerable 
members of society do not have concrete rights. These trends can have significant impact on the 
lives and rights of children in the families affected.
Due Process
Some critics like Bala (1991) comment on how the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and 
Freedoms has influenced current child welfare practice in that the focus of the law tends to be on 
formal due process entitlements for the parents, whether or not such due process can be exercised 
in reality as anticipated in the wording of the legislation, due to financial and other constraints.
In terms of specific due process provisions, Bala (1991) outlines how “parents whose children 
are apprehended from their care are entitled to a judicial hearing within a reasonable time . . .
[and further, the Charter also] restrict[s] the authority of child protection workers to apprehend 
children without prior judicial authorization” (p. 5). Bala (1991) however does acknowledge that 
delays still continue to occur in the courts (p. 5). Ironically, Blishen (1991) discusses how 
legally formalizing Canadian child protection legislation “increasingly mirror[s] society’s focus 
on protection of individual civil rights” (p. 195) as reflected in the Charter. According to Blishen 
(1991), this focus leads to a more court-based adversarial approach to child protection.
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The court process sets out in the legislation that the Director or delegate must apply for a 
supervision order (section 29.1) at a presentation hearing that must occur no later than seven days 
after removal of a child (section 34). The subsequent step to the presentation hearing is a 
protection hearing which the court must set on the earliest possible date for hearing (section 37). 
The legislation anticipates that the protection hearing will occur within 45 days of conclusion of 
the first hearing date. If the Director or delegate seeks to remove a child, the presentation hearing 
is also stated to take place within seven days (section 42.1). Many of the Child, Family and 
Community Service Act provisions together establish an involved and complex legal court- 
focused process relating to child protection matters.
On the face of the legislation, exact time limits attach to the various steps and procedures; 
however, the courts do not necessarily apply so rigorously those time lines, and there are a 
number of factors that are generally treated by the courts as a reasonable justification for delays. 
Current closures and cutbacks in service delivery within the provincial courts affect availability 
of court dates, particularly in more remote areas of the province. For instance, the protection 
hearing rarely if never occurs within the 45 day timeframe.' Sometimes legislated time frames in 
child protection proceedings become practical impossibilities. At the practical level during these 
delays, not only are the parents’ due process rights eompromised but also, there arises 
detrimental impact on children. Children who are subject of the protection proceedings can be 
left in a state of uncertainty and instability, moving between parental and government- 
administered care. In the case of Jack v. Director o f  Child, Family and Community Services 
(2000), the British Columbia Court of Appeal made little of the “legislative intent” to establish
‘ A major factor in Prince George and other parts o f northern British Columbia for delay in scheduling court hearings 
is lack o f court date availability. This information I have gathered from my former practice as a family lawyer and 
discussion with other lawyers in Prince George.
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certain time limits in stating,
Because these cases are evolving situations involving the lives of children and their 
parents, it is generally not desirable that flexibility in dealing with these matters should be 
in any way discouraged by the courts. The process should be kept as informal as possible 
(p. 456).
The Court also gave deference to consensual resolution whenever possible as the best approach 
to these cases.
Recommendation no. 69 of the Gove Report suggested that the new legislation, the Child, 
Family and Community Service Act, establish that ehildren have a right to early determinations of 
decisions affecting their lives and that if delays are due to other parties, there be an onus on the 
other parties to justify such delay. This onus has not attached to the court system itself, the 
frequent cause for delay. In undertaking the review of the extent of implementation of the Gove 
Report recommendations, the British Columbia Ombudsman (1998) eommented on the rationale 
of the children’s ministry for not addressing Gove’s recommendation no. 69 with the following 
words:
The Ministry is concerned that, if this recommendation is adopted, courts may have to 
bump criminal and Young Offenders Act cases to accommodate child protection cases.
The Ministry questions how it can direct a court on how it will decide which cases it will 
hear in which order. It is up to the court to determine its own procedure and priorities (p. 
29).
The Ombudsman made these comments prior to the current fiseal cutbaeks to the court system 
throughout the province. The full impact of recent court-related cutbaeks remains to be assessed.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
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Concurrent with these larger trends in the justice system is an increasing use of mediation 
in child protection cases. Provisions in the Child, Family and Community Service Act provide 
for alternative dispute resolution processes including family conferences and mediation. 
Consistent with broader trends in the justice system, the current focus of MCFD is to move 
increasingly in that direction.
Section 20 sets out the terms of a family conference. The purpose of such a conference is 
to assist the family to develop a plan that will serve the child’s best interests. An interesting 
aspect of this section is that the plan should, “take into account the wishes, needs and role of the 
family.” Here in other words, the family is treated as a unified whole with consistent wishes and 
needs among the family members presumed. The only reference in this section to a possible 
spokesperson on behalf of the family is in section 20(4) which states, “the family conference 
coordinator may, after talking to the parent or other family member, convene.. . ” A family 
conference coordinator according to Section 1 of the Act is someone designated by the Director. 
Here then, much discretion is left to the Director and designates to determine who will be 
deemed to speak for the family. The wording of this provision in referring to “the parent” 
assumes a single parent without addressing the possibility that two parents with opposing views 
may be involved. Further, in contrast to other provisions in the Act concerning court processes 
that specifically address children 12 years and older, there is no mention here of the child or 
children being entitled to have any role in or be informed about the family conference.
Section 22 of the Act addresses mediation. This section refers to “the director and any 
person” agreeing to mediation or other alternative dispute resolution mechanism. In other words, 
it is left wide open as to who the person participating in the mediation or other alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism might be. A related aspect to the use of mediation is that as set out in
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section 23, the court may adjourn the court proceedings for up to three months so that this 
process can take place. The notion of mediation as an alternative dispute resolution process 
presumes a relatively equal balance of power between the two parties to the mediation and is not 
a preferred practice where one party cannot assert his or her position without being under fear or 
duress (Landau et al, 2000). The legislation is not at all developed in terms of addressing the 
respective rights of parties to mediation, whether those parties are the parents or child.
To the contrary, the three-month possible delay envisioned in Section 23 could potentially 
interfere with the Section 7 right of the parent identified in the discussed case of New Brunswick 
(Minister o f  Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.) (1999), that being the psychological 
integrity of the parent and the right not to have that interfered with by the government except in 
accordance with principles of fundamental justice. The provision in Section 23(1) of the Child, 
Family and Community Service Act that there first to be a court application is an important 
guideline in this regard.
The wording of Section 22 sets out no limit on what an agreement between the Director 
and person should look like when entering into an alternative dispute resolution process, thereby 
leaving open the possibility that such “agreement” may take place by coercive means on the part 
of Director or delegate pursuant to the legislation. The reference to “any person” allows for the 
possibility of this provision being invoked in relation to a dispute between Director or delegate 
and anyone, whether or not a party or person entitled to notice in the court proceeding.
The Surrey Court Project: Facilitated Planning Meeting (Focus Consultants, 2002) is a 
pilot project in the South Fraser region of British Columbia which develops mediation beyond 
the scope of Section 22 of the legislation. In this pilot project, a court work supervisor identifies 
potential mediation child protection cases, receives referrals, attends orientation sessions with the
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social worker and attends the mediation session (“planning meeting”). An administrative 
coordinator assigns a mediator and schedules meetings. The pilot project has yet to fully address 
children’s rights.
It remains to be seen whether current liberal discourse around human rights developed in 
a highly legal procedural manner will translate to emerging alternative dispute processes.
Barsky (1999) and Savoury et al (1995) outline that situations involving risk or potential risk and 
the issue of whether or not abuse or neglect has taken place are not appropriate subjects for 
mediation; however, the British Columbia legislation contains no such limitation. In looking at 
the issue of attorney - social worker relations with each other in northwest United States in the 
context of collaborative child welfare practice, Johnson and Cahn (1995) suggested that barriers 
to collaborative (versus adversarial) approaches arise out of “conflicting conceptions of the role 
each profession should play,” a phenomenon aggravated by the structure and requirements of the 
court system that handle the issues” (p. 385).
Indeed, this reference to alternative dispute resolution in the British Columbia Child, 
Family and Community Service Act is crowded by an elaborate, technical and most often 
adversarial court context where rights tend to be aggressively advanced. Some lawyers 
practicing child protection law in British Columbia simply take the approach of advising their 
clients not to participate in child protection mediations.^ The question that remains before the 
law is to what extent mediation and other alternative dispute resolution processes deal with the 
issue of rights.
Alternative dispute resolution processes like mediation have significantly different
^This statement I gather from information provided by other lawyers and firsthand experience practising family law 
in Prince George, British Columbia.
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philosophical bases and orientations than court processes do. The basis for court process is very 
much liberalism which according to Mullaly (1997), rests on central concern for individualism 
and individual freedoms. Emerging notions of alternative dispute resolution do not have this 
same philosophical basis. For instance, whereas the courts focus very much on the individual 
“rights” and “positions” of the parties, current alternative dispute resolution practices such as 
mediation in the province rest more on the “interests” of the participating parties. In discussing 
emerging models of child protection mediation in British Columbia, Christofferson et al (2002) 
distinguish between a rights-based approach to mediation and an interest-based approach, the 
latter being focused on substantive, procedural and psychological needs of both parties rather 
than the two parties’ rights pitted against each other.
This distinction may be significant when considering children’s rights as set out in the 
Convention. It is unclear from the wording of Sections 22 and 23 of the Child, Family and 
Community Service Act what role if any children are to take in such alternative dispute resolution 
processes. In the absence of legislative stipulation to the contrary, it appears that children could 
participate in such processes; however, the British Columbia legislation makes no provision for 
legal counsel in this context. Furthermore, there are not other legislated safeguards in place at 
present to provide protection for the interests (or rights) of the child in this context.
Whereas there is a clearly identified overlap in the Convention between children’s rights 
and interests, the way in which legal rights for the most vulnerable members of society have 
evolved in the common law tradition is through the rule of law as interpreted and applied by the 
courts. On a more practical level however, the Convention sets out a unique version of human 
rights somewhat distinctive from adults’ rights, for instance, in its insistence on the importance 
of family and adequate care in the child’s life. Stated otherwise, the Convention does not posit a
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child as an independent individual as presupposed for adults in contemporary Canadian law and 
as articulated in traditional liberal legal rights discourse. In moving away from the traditional 
liberal philosophical basis, alternative dispute resolution offers the potential to address children’s 
“rights” in novel ways; however, the current British Columbia child protection legislation, court- 
focused as it is, does not currently allow for such potential development to occur.
Emerging alternative dispute resolution initiatives, while holding the potential of 
enhancing increased community involvement (Barsky, 1999), present a number of challenges 
relating to the rights of parents, one or the other of the parents (for instance if there is abuse by 
one parent of the other), extended family and children themselves. The full impact of these 
challenges is beyond the scope of my inquiry but will need to be addressed in the future if human 
rights are to continue as currently understood in legal discourse.
The Child’s Views and Right o f  Participation 
An aspect of the “guiding principles” set out in Section 2 of the Child, Family and 
Community Service Act is that “the child’s views should be taken into account when decisions 
relating to a child are made.” It is a broad statement of principle, with no age limitations 
explicitly attached to it; however, there is virtually no further direct addressing of this principle in 
the legislation. Therefore, lacking from the legislation is the practical means by which this 
principle is to be put into effect, especially for children under 12 years old.
Article 12 of the Convention sets out:
The child who is capable of forming his or her own views [has] the right to express those 
views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due 
weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any
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judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
national law.
Recommendation no. 75 of the Gove Report called for children to be informed about 
judicial and administrative decisions affecting them and to be able to express their views. The 
Child, Family and Community Service Act includes notice provisions directed at older children 
who are subject of protection proceedings but is silent on their views being expressed. In the 
1998 review of the implementation of the Gove Report, the British Columbia Ombudsman held 
that these notice provisions are defined in the following ways:
1. They apply only to children 12 years and over;
2. They relate only to court and not to administrative decisions; and
3. They do not specify children’s rights to attend at and participate in hearings
(Ombudsman British Columbia, 1998, p. 32).
Therefore, despite the legislative emphasis given to court process in the Child, Family 
and Community Service Act, very little emphasis is placed on children’s roles and none of the 
provisions address their right to participate in these proceedings, the emphasis instead being on 
the parents’ roles. In fact, the law places much emphasis on parents’ right in this context, going 
as far as to characterize them as Section 7 Charter rights as in New Brunswick (Minister o f  
Health and Community Services v. G. (J.) (1999).
An interesting aspect of the New Brunswick (1999) case is how there is no mention of 
children’s due process rights alongside discussion of the parents. What the Court says is, “A 
removal and court proceeding are undoubtedly difficult for a young child and children should be 
protected from further stress to the degree feasible without infringing on the due process required
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to protect the interests of the parents.” This judicial comment parallels the gap in the Child, 
Family and Community Service Act with respect to due process rights for children. The issue of 
whether or not the Act is sufficient in this regard was not before the Court. In judicial 
determinations, the Convention is persuasive but not strictly binding. The tenor of this decision 
strongly suggests that the courts view parents’ and not children’s due process rights as a central 
aspect of the Child, Family and Community Service Act. It is in cases such as this one that the 
role of the Court is to provide interpretation that is consistent with legislative intent and 
Canadian law.
Coupled with this gap in the legislation is the issue of legal aid availability in British 
Columbia. The Child, Family and Community Service Act states in a number of clauses that a 
child over 12 years old should be notified about court process concerning his or her case; 
however, there is only provision in the legal aid tariff providing for the child to be referred to a 
lawyer in two situations: if the child is over 12 years old and subject to a Section 60 consent 
order; or if she or he is a ward of the Director AND consents to the adoption of his or her own 
child (British Columbia Legal Services Society, 1999). It is limited coverage. The first, that is 
over 12 years old and subject to a Section 60 consent order, is the most common area of legal aid 
referral.^
Section 60 of the Child, Family and Community Service Act speaks to consent orders. 
This section establishes that after a presentation hearing in court, and with the written consent of 
the affected parties including the child over 12 years old, the court may make a custody or 
supervision order including a continuing custody order. This order would be entered without a
^As o f date of writing a spokesperson for the Ministry of Children and Family Development Data Services Branch 
reports that the Ministry do not keep statistics on the number of lawyers appointed to children. A lawyer employed 
by British Columbia Legal Services Society furnished the information stated in this thesis, based on her experience.
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full court hearing taking place. In other words, if a child protection matter is contested regardless 
of the child’s age, it may proceed to court hearing without an obligation on anyone to see that the 
child is provided with access to and financial resources to pay for a lawyer.
The Child, Family and Community Service Act includes a significant number of 
provisions setting out the court proceedings in child protection cases. Although the Convention 
makes no such distinction, the Act at a number of places, arbitrarily distinguishes between 
children 12 years and older and children under 12 years old, with respect to their right to be 
informed about protection proceedings. As stated, according to British Columbia government 
statistics (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family Development, 2003a), almost half 
of the children in care as of March 2003 were under 12 years old. In the provisions concerning 
notice about child protection court proceedings, the Act states that if the child is 12 years or 
older, she or he must be notified of the various mandatory proceedings. Even in the case of 
children 12 years and older, the statutory obligation goes no further than simply providing notice 
of a given hearing. This provision is inadequate when considered in the context of the 
Convention.
Article 12 of the Convention sets out clear participation rights of the child not only to 
freely express his or her views but also to participate in any judicial or administrative proceeding 
affecting him or her. Although the Convention establishes age and maturity of the child will be 
relevant to the weight of his or her views, these factors are not set out as reasons to preclude a 
given child from the participation right. Covell and Howe (2001) assert that “participation” of 
the child is a fundamental component of the “best interests principle” (p. 25). As Flekkoy (1997) 
outlines, this right of participation is inherent and should not require a child first meet a 
particular threshold before considered to have that right :
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Incompetence cannot fairly be a good reason for denying rights, for children any more 
than for adults. If this were done, many adults would also be excluded. But in the 
present situation there is discrimination against children, who seem to be obliged to prove 
competence, while adults can only be denied rights if they are proven incompetent. This 
should also be the principle for children (Flekkoy, 1997, p. 48).
Statement o f Children’s Rights 
In addition, the single articulation of children’s specific rights in this legislation is tied to 
children in care; the Act lacks a more general statement of children’s rights regardless of whether 
or not they are in care and there does not exist in British Columbia at present any other legislated 
statement of the rights of all children. The Convention contains no such limit on children’s 
rights. Section I of the Child, Family and Community Service Act defines “care” as “physical 
care and control of the child,” and in the context of Section 70, presumably means in the care of 
the Director. According to Section 70(1) of the Act, children in care have certain rights including 
the following:
b) to be informed about their plans of care;
c) to be consulted and to express their views, according to their abilities, about 
significant decisions affecting them;
n) to be informed about and to be assisted in contacting the child and youth officer under 
the Office for Children and Youth Act or the Ombudsman;
o) to be informed of their rights under this Act and the procedures available for enforcing 
their rights.
This Section arguably then, does not relate to the situation in which a child protection
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investigation is underway, but the child is not in eare of the Director. In addition, this section 
lacks specific provision for how these rights are going to be supported or enforced. Such a 
statement of rights, while identifying certain entitlements children in eare have, places no clear 
responsibility on anyone to ensure that these rights are respected and enforced. There is no 
provision for a child or child’s advocate to seek a remedy through the court of an alleged right 
violation; therefore, the issue of whether or not the rights are enforced becomes an administrative 
matter. In the absence of specific legislative provision speaking to enforceability of these rights, 
at law, this legislation is nothing more than a hollow statement of rights. In other words, much is 
left to the discretion of those persons administering the legislation. There is no consequence set 
out for anyone who chooses not to implement these particular rights; therefore, these identified 
rights potentially have very little import in the absence of adequate procedures that would see 
them come into effect in a consistent and meaningful manner.
In addition, the wording leaves much discretion as to the parameters of the rights. In 
reference to (b), what constitutes sufficient information to the child or how it will be 
implemented precisely is not defined. In relation to (c), it is not established in the legislation 
how a child’s abilities will be determined or exactly who will have the responsibility for 
determining what his or her abilities are. There is no provision speaking to the accountability to 
the child on the part of the person who makes such a determination. This clause does not identify 
what decisions constitute “significant” decisions; the word “significant” is therefore another term 
open to interpretation. In addition, the clause does not identify who will determine whether or 
not the decision in question is significant. With respect to (n), the clause does not identify in 
what situations a child will be informed about the identified external review mechanisms 
available to him or her nor does it identify what form this informing will take. Finally, in regard
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to (o), neither the means nor the procedures available for enforcing rights is explicitly set out, 
again leaving much to interpretation and diminishing the impact of this legislative provision.
In its Public Report no. 36 of March 1998, the Ombudsman of British Columbia made 
two recommendations concerning children’s rights to express their views as set out in Article 12 
of the Convention;
1. Para. 70(1 )(c) [of the Child, Family and Community Service Act] apply to all children 
in the care or custody of the Ministry including those in places of confinement. This 
recommendation is critical to ensure that particularly vulnerable children in care who may 
be in places of confinement for treatment or rehabilitation have the right to be heard and 
to access the Ombudsman and Advocate.
2. All sections of the [legislation] that impose an arbitrary age restriction (under 12 or 12 
and over) on the duty contained in paragraph 70(1 )(c) ‘to be consulted and to express 
their views, according to their abilities, about significant decisions that affect them,’ be 
removed, including sections 55 through 60 of the [Act]. The right to be consulted in 
paragraph 70(l)(c) would extend to all children in receipt of services under the [Act].
This is in keeping with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (p. 32).
These recommendations are both astute and worthy of incorporation in the British Columbia 
legislation in order to bring about further compliance with the Convention and increased formal 
acknowledgement of children’s rights.
The facts of the British Columbia Supreme Court decision, L.S. and S.S. v. The Ministry 
o f Children and Family Development et al. (2003), involved a 10 year old child with fetal alcohol 
syndrome placed in a foster home under a continuing custody order. The foster parent of the 
child filed in court to enforce the child’s rights as against the Director. Following allegations of
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sexual touching eventually determined to be unfounded, the foster father was not permitted by 
the Ministry to live in the home with the child and sought to re-enter the home on the basis that 
the child’s interests would be “best served by living with the only father she knows, this being a 
right to be nurtured according to community standards for which Section 70(1 )(a) of the Act 
provides.”
In considering the ambit of Section 70(1) of the Act, the Court cited how Section 10 of 
the former Children’s Commission Act permitted a complaint about breach of a Section 70 right 
to the children’s commissioner. Because that Act had been repealed, the Court held that foster 
parents had no legal basis to initiate proceedings to have the child’s rights enforced. The Court 
stated, “it does appear that the current legislation provides for rights the breach of which is 
without remedy as long as the Director remains the guardian of the child” (pp. 11-12). This case 
is currently under appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeal. As Kent (1995) notes, 
“human rights in the law rests on the principle that where there is a right, there must be a 
remedy” (p. 147).
Administrative Accountability
Kent (1995) identifies how, when addressing children’s human rights, implementation 
and accountability mechanisms are both crucial and both should be reflected in the law itself. He 
maintains, “If the law says that children are entitled to some particular service as a matter of 
right, the law should also establish an accountability mechanism” (p. 145). Article 25 of the 
Convention provides, “State Parties recognize the right of a child who has been placed by the 
competent authorities for the purpose of care, protection or treatment of his or her physical or 
mental health to a periodic review of the treatment provided to the child.” On its face, this 
provision could relate to child protection placements. As identified, much focus of the Child,
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Family and Community Services Act is setting out court procedure; however, few of these 
legislative provisions relate to administrative decisions which fall outside the scope of court 
reviewed decisions of Ministry staff and delegates. Section 93(3) of the Act establishes that the 
Director must “in accordance with the regulations, establish a procedure for reviewing the 
exercise of the director’s powers, duties and functions under this Act.”
The Act here leaves discretion to the Director about what the procedure will include and 
in this way, this particular provision may be lacking from a constitutional perspective. Jones and 
Villars (1994) suggest “it is extremely important to identify the ambit of discretion which 
legislation has delegated to a particular executive office” (p. 75), but in terms of administrative 
accountability, this has not been done in the Child, Family and Community Service Act. 
Legislative delegates such as the Director in this case are legally bound to follow the principle of 
natural justice and the duty to be fair (Jones and Villars, 1994), concepts that have evolved 
through the common law. Human rights parallel this common law principle and have direct 
relevance in assessing the adequacy of administrative discretion in particular circumstances.
In 1997, MCFD implemented an internal complaints resolution process (Children’s 
Commission, 2001). In 1999 and 2000, before its abolition, the British Columbia Children’s 
Commission conducted evaluations of this internal complaints process of the Ministry 
(Children’s Commission, 2001). The standards used for monitoring in this evaluation process 
included: child-centeredness; fairness; accessibility; and responsiveness (Children’s 
Commission, 2001). The Commission found that over forty per cent of the complaints related to 
issues about children in eare. The complaints were then broken down in relation to the rights set 
out in Section 70, and some of those findings are as follows:
(b) to be informed about their plan of care 20.2%
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c) to be consulted and to express their views 10.6%
about significant decisions affecting them
(n) to be informed about and assisted with contacting 3.4%
the [then] Family Advocate or Ombudsman
(Children’s Commission, 2001).
The Children’s Commission (2001) also found that children and youth were the 
complainants in nine per cent of cases and sixty five per cent were by family members. They 
interviewed thirty-two complainants. In over thirty per cent of these cases, the complainants 
identified that a barrier to child-centeredness in this complaints process was that children were 
not provided an opportunity to be heard. There was not sufficient input from the child or youth 
in question. Another related concern is that the Commission had a perceived lack of power to 
resolve complaints as in many cases, the complaint was redirected to MCFD and the complaint 
process became lengthy. The Commission’s recommendations were not binding. Only one third 
of complainants felt they were treated fairly during the complaints process due to such factors as 
perceived power imbalance; resources; legal representation; knowledge of the system; length of 
the process; and dismissive attitudes of Children’s Commission staff. Overall, the evaluation 
findings indicated that the complaints resolution process was lacking. The key recommendations 
of the Commission coming out of this evaluation were that a more comprehensive complaint 
resolution process be implemented, evaluated and monitored jointly by MCFD and the 
Commission; that guidelines be established to assist staff in responding to complaints; and 
regular reporting from the Ministry to the Commission about progress. The Children’s 
Commission was abolished in 2002 and so, has not undertaken any further work in this regard 
nor does the legislation establish a legal requirement for any independent body to do any follow-
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up or further in-depth evaluation of the quality and procedure around MCFD internal complaint 
processing.
Advocacy fo r  Children 
In the field of child welfare, the concept of “child advocacy” has historically been used 
broadly to describe “anyone who works for or on behalf of children who have been abused or 
neglected” (Litzelfelner & Petr, 1997, p. 394), an amorphous understanding of the term that 
possibly has contributed to the term ’s loss of specific meaning. In a field such as child welfare 
which tends toward detailed legislative policy provisions, particularly in terms of court processes, 
this critique of the vagueness of the advocacy definition appears legitimate. In the broad sense, 
two rather different understandings of the term emerge: on the one hand, social advocacy, 
meaning political action to effect large scale changes for all children involved in the child 
welfare system; and on the other hand, ease advocacy, meaning advocacy on a case-by-case basis 
(Litzelfelner & Petr, 1997).
Currently in terms of social advocacy, the Canadian Coalition for the Rights of the Child 
and its member organizations across the country have taken a lead role in terms of commenting 
on government policy (the focus being federal), maintaining communication with the United 
Nations and providing for direct youth input and involvement. The Coalition’s mandate is broad 
however and does not focus as much on the day-to-day functioning of the British Columbia child 
protection system and its impact on the lives of particular children and their families.
At the provincial level, the British Columbia Association of Social Workers is one of 
over sixty organizations which are part of First Call, BC Child and Youth Advocacy Coalition. 
Based out of Vancouver, this coalition has a mission to increase understanding and advocacy for 
legislation, policy and practice to assist children and youth to have resources and opportunities to
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reach full potential and to participate more fully in society (First Call, 2002). This coalition 
formed in the aftermath of Canada’s ratifieation of the Convention and is active in terms of social 
advocacy for children in this province (First Call, 2002).
Traditionally, the latter of these two understandings of advocacy, case advocacy, has 
found purchase in various legislative provisions. Blishen (1991) outlines how child advocacy on 
an individual level pursuant to the law has traditionally encompassed one of three specific 
approaches: advoeate; guardian; or amicus curiae. An advocate focuses on advancing the child’s 
interests. A guardian serves a dual role as investigator and counsel. The main goal of amicus 
curiae - friend of the Court - is to provide assistance to the Court (p. 197).
Litzelfelner and Petr (1997) critique advocacy models that involve either child welfare 
agency workers or lawyers exelusively filling the role of child advocate due to the limitations 
inherent in either position that do not fully address the unique needs of ehildren in abusive or 
neglectful living situations - on the one hand, agency child welfare workers have institutional 
mandates to fulfill and as I have outlined, may find themselves conflieted between the objectives 
of the organization and the best interests of the child in a given case. On the other hand, lawyers 
are uncomfortable dealing with potential discrepancies that might arise between a child’s wishes 
and best interests. Added to this latter point is the issue of capacity; lawyers tend to be 
uncomfortable taking legal instructions from individuals such as children deemed by the law to 
be under a legal handicap and to lack capacity to instruct counsel. Melton (1986) asserts that 
“ehild advoeates are apt to find themselves quiekly on the defensive if their foeus is protecting 
children’s individual rights due to a prevalent perception that protecting children’s rights will 
undermine the traditional family unit” (p. 1234) and with the family, children’s welfare.
Discussions around child advocacy beg the question articulated by some writers including
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Litzelfelner and Petr (1997): Who is the best spokesperson for the child? Bala (1991) observes 
how child advocacy programs “reflect a concern that the bureaucratic nature of child protection 
agencies may not always be in the best interests of children” (p. 14). Melton (1986) looked at the 
ethical issues that might arise during the course of child advocacy work. He suggests the role of 
an advocate is rather political in that it is not simply to help children but to empower them in 
such a way they are better able to make use of societal resources (p. 358).
In British Columbia, the Gove Report (1995) recommended the establishment of a 
Children’s Commission as an independent complaints investigator with a central quality 
assurance role (Vol. II, p. 282). His vision was that this Commission would accompany and 
work alongside a Child Welfare Review Board which would have responsibility for the review of 
rights violations for children in care pursuant to section 70 of the Child, Family and Community 
Service Act and for reviewing complaints about child welfare service providers’ administrative 
decisions (Vol. H, p. 282). No such body currently exists in British Columbia.
Unlike some other jurisdictions’ child protection legislation, the Child, Family and 
Community Service Act lacks specific reference to advocacy services for children. In terms of 
legislated child advocacy in British Columbia, the two most significant current Acts are the 
British Columbia Office fo r  Children and Youth Act (2002) and the Ombudsman Act (1996).
The Office fo r  Children and Youth Act (2002) was proclaimed into law in September 2002 to 
replace the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act (1996) and the Children’s Commission Act 
(1997). Both the Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act (1996) and Children’s Commission Act 
(1997) were enacted subsequent to the Gove Report (1995) and were the enabling statutes for the 
Office of Child, Youth and Family Advocacy and the Children’s Commission. The provincial 
government has also repealed the regulations enacted pursuant to the two former Acts. No
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regulation accompanies the new legislation as of the date of writing.
In the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child Second Report o f  Canada covering the 
period January 1993 to December 1997 (United Nations Offiee of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 1997), submitted to the United Nations, the British Columbia government at the 
time outlined some of the measures taken at the provincial level to bring about compliance with 
the Convention. In that document, “General Measures of Implementation” included the 
following:
the proclamation of the Children’s Commission Act. . . and the creation of the Children’s 
Commission in September 1996. The purpose of the commission is to ensure that key 
aspects of the ehild-serving systems of government are monitored and that the quality of 
its work is assessed and reported on publicly (Para. 595).
In addition,
there is now a Child, Youth and Family Advoeate established through the Child, Youth 
and Family Advocacy A ct... The advocate’s role is to help ehildren, youth and their 
families who are involved with the Ministry of Children and Families to ensure that they 
receive the services they are entitled to and to ensure that proper proeesses are followed 
in the delivery of those services” (Para. 596).
Under the former Child, Youth and Family Advocacy Act (1996), a limitation of the ehild 
advoeate role was that Seetion 5 stipulated that the advocate was not to aet as legal eounsel. 
Instead, the legislation set out for the advocate a number of powers ineluding: investigating; 
initiating and participating in case eonferences, administrative reviews, mediations and other 
processes about provision of designated services; meeting with and interviewing ehildren and
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their families; informing the public about children’s needs and rights; and making 
recommendations about legislation, policy and practice; and making agreements to ensure child 
advocacy. In addition, for the purpose of carrying out the powers set out in the Act, the advocate 
could enter facilities wherein services are provided to children and youths.
Some of the powers of the now abolished Children’s Commission were: collecting 
information about critical injuries sustained by children while receiving designated services; 
making recommendations concerning such critical injuries; setting standards to be followed by 
prescribed ministries or government agencies; monitoring the extent to which the ministries and 
agencies are following any prescribed standards; reviewing and resolving complaints by a child, 
the child’s parent, the Advocate or other person representing the child about the child’s rights 
being breached while in care or decisions concerning the provision of designated services; 
monitoring and auditing plans of care for children in continuing care of the government; and 
providing public education aimed at increasing understanding of the Commission’s role 
{Children’s Commission Act, 1997, Section 4 [repealed]). The role of the Children’s 
Commission in reviewing possible rights violations under Section 70 of the Child, Family and  
Community Service Act is abolished. An important aspect of the Children’s Commission was 
how it had a mandate to address the cases of all children in the province, whether or not in care. 
In its 1998 review of the implementation of the Gove Report, the British Columbia Ombudsman 
noted that recommendation no. 95 of the Gove Report called for child welfare constituency in the 
province to include all children.
A related recommendation of the Gove Report (1995) was the establishment of a Child 
Welfare Review Board which would have a mandate to review the following:
I. The apparent breach of a child-in-care’s statutory rights under section 70 of the Child,
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Family and Community Service Act, and
2. Any other important administrative child welfare decision respecting entitlement to or
quality of service (Gove, 1995).
To this date, the British Columbia government has not established a Child Welfare Review 
Board as proposed in the Gove Report; however, in its 1998 review of the Gove Report 
implementation, the British Columbia Ombudsman observed that the Tribunal Division of the 
Children’s Commission satisfied the anticipated function of such a review board. With the 
repeal of the Children’s Commission Act (1997), the tribunal division is also abolished.
Collectively, the role of these two offices was to help bring about a certain amount of 
accountability on the part of the provincial ministries that provide services to children and youths 
in British Columbia. The offices addressed formal legal accountability if not practical 
accountability. On the practical level, the extent to which these bodies were effective 
throughout the province remains unclear; both were centralized out of Vancouver or Victoria and 
quite removed from the day-to-day line level functioning of child welfare services throughout the 
province.
The current Office fo r  Child and Youth Act (2002) establishes the Office for Children and 
Youth in place of the two pre-existing child advocacy offices. Section 3(1) of the Act sets out 
that the functions of this office are to “provide support to children, youth and families in 
obtaining relevant services and to provide independent observations and advice to government 
about the state of services provided or funded by government and youth.” The corresponding 
investigatory powers of this office are much more limited than those of the previous Children’s 
Commission and Child, Youth and Family Advocate. Section 6 of the Office fo r  Child and 
Youth Act (2002) stipulates that this office can conduct investigations at the request of the
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Attorney General and then must submit a confidential report of the findings to the Attorney 
General. Pursuant to subsection 6(2), the Attorney General retains discretion to decide whether 
or not the report is to be kept confidential. The only stated investigatory powers of the office 
relate to this limited function; for the other listed functions of this office, there are no 
corresponding powers of investigation, monitoring or enforcement set out in the legislation.
In Section 3, one of the stated discretionary functions of this office is to “provide 
information and advice to children, youth and their families about how to become effective self 
advocates [emphasis added] with respects to the rights of children and youth in care under the 
Child, Family and Community Service Act. There is at date of writing no corresponding 
provision in the Child, Family and Community Service Act to outline how or who would have 
responsibility to respond to such self-advocacy and by what means. Rather, the Child, Family 
and Community Service Act is entirely silent on the matter of advocacy.
The advocacy role of this office is limited to “extraordinary circumstances” in subsection 
3(2)(c) of the Act. Extraordinary is a word subject to interpretation and suggestive of cases 
outside the norm; therefore, the role of this office is much more limited than the previous 
Children’s Commission and the Office of the Child, Youth and Family Advocate. Another 
legislated function of this office is to promote and coordinate “in communities [emphasis added] 
the establishment of advocacy services for children, youth and their families” (subsection 
3(2)(d)). In other words, just as the British Columbia government anticipates as the 
administration of child protection services is to be decentralized (British Columbia, 2002), so too 
is child advocacy. This wording suggests that child advocacy offices will be non-governmental 
organizations. What is lacking from this and from any other legislation is the identification of 
exactly what community-based child advocacy services should or will entail and who is to take
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financial responsibility for the associated expenses. In addition, what is not identified is the 
particular role and mandate of these offices, nor what authority they will have. In the absence of 
specific legislative provisions outlining specifically what the offices will do and what powers 
they have, there could be a lack of effectiveness on the part of these offices in implementing 
changes as there will be no formal obligation on the child protection service providers to account 
to these offices. In addition, in the context of small towns and rural areas in particular, it remains 
to be seen what form child advocacy will take. Without a legislative framework for the delivery 
of these services, checking public accountability becomes a more complex and daunting task. In 
other words, law provides the means by which offices such as advocacy offices obtain clout and 
credibility, having behind them the force of law. In the absence of supporting legal provision in 
such a highly legislated context, child advocacy becomes difficult.
Other than this reference to self advocacy in the Office fo r  Child and Youth Act (2002), 
there is currently no British Columbia legislative provision that supports or outlines the ability of 
children and youths to self-advocate and be heard, in terms of child protection and other child- 
related services in the province. As identified. Article 12 of the Convention provides the basis 
for such a role on the part of any child capable of forming his or her own views. The implication 
of this legislative gap is that if children and youths are to self-advocate, there is no legally 
enforceable means by which there is a requirement on others (policy developers and service 
providers within the administrative realm) to take account of the views and input of children and 
youths nor is there specific provision for resources to support child self-advocacy programs. In 
1999, under the auspices of the former Children’s Commission, there was generated a brief 
public report entitled The Youth Report: A Report About Youth by Youth. Four youths travelled 
around the province to interview other youths. A statement in this report is as follows:
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Youth in care have opinions and need to be heard! ! This is the main message that we 
were given by youth living in foster care and in group homes across B.C. They told us 
that sometimes they are not taken seriously by adults, and so they would like to see youth 
in care educating adults about the issues and challenges that they deal with (Children’s 
Commission, 1999, p. 24).
The age group of the youths interviewed was between 12 and 19 years old; younger children did 
not participate. In addition, these interviews focused on youths in care. Despite recent examples 
in British Columbia of some youths in care becoming more vocal about their situations, there is 
still a legislative gap in this regard. In the absence of legislative provision outlining not only 
youths’ formal role but also the obligation of service providers to respond meaningfully, such 
youth activism may have limited effectiveness in bringing about youth-recommended changes in 
the child protection realm. It remains to be seen whether child and youth self-advocacy can 
develop in a meaningful and impactful way in British Columbia.
The identification of “self advocacy” in the Office fo r  Child and Youth Act (2002) did not 
exist in the prior legislation and thus marks something of a philosophical shift in the provincial 
government’s approach to child advocacy. It represents an interesting contrast with the way in 
which the law relating to children has evolved in both international conventional and Canadian 
law. The Preamble of the Convention states, “the child, by reason of his [her] physical and 
mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection...,” a 
notion that has some similarities to parens patriae as it has developed in Canadian law. The 
wording of the Convention’s Preamble does not reconcile with this new wording contained in the 
Office fo r  Child and Youth Act (2002), thereby marking a philosophical conflict between 
universal human rights as enshrined in the Convention on the one hand and residual social policy
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orientation on the other. The residual approach, according to Moroney (1991) rests on the 
“fundamental belief [that] most of the time, people will be able to take care of their own needs” 
(p. 140). This residual approach has interesting implications when applied to children in light of 
the overarching protectionist quality of the law pertaining to children and the perceived 
vulnerability of children.
In regard to the Convention Preamble’s mention of children needing “special safeguards 
and care, including appropriate legal protection,” this concept becomes rather unclear in the 
context of the current trend of decentralization in British Columbia. What is legal protection? 
British Columbia law is built on the foundations of the English common law and the Canadian 
Constitution that establishes a legal division of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments. With the current trend toward decentralization in the realm of child welfare, the 
“rule of law” and the concept of “legal protection” are to be cast into a rather different light than 
has been traditionally understood in Canadian society. Law-making power, as understood within 
the legal community and system, rests with the judiciary (through judge-made case law), federal 
Parliament, the Provincial Legislatures and to a lesser extent, municipal governments. There are 
no other bodies or groups of people who are recognized under the legal system as having the 
ability to create enforceable laws. In addition, according to Jones and Villars (1994), a 
legislative body such as the British Columbia government cannot legally “abdicate their 
legislative functions” (p. 28). Delegation however, is appropriate. If the administration of child 
welfare is to be devolved to the community level, it remains to be seen how appropriate legal 
protection as called for in the Convention, will be put into place.
The abstract concept of “community” as set out in the Office fo r  Children and Youth Act 
(2002) remains unclear. In addition, because such “communities” have no law-making authority
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or constitutional standing recognized in the Canadian legal system, the notion of “legal 
protection” mentioned in the Convention becomes in this context, non-existent other than in 
relation to the extent of the provincial government's continuing involvement. A related issue is 
that the Convention establishes that the “State Parties” agree to these human rights standards for 
children. There is no mention in the Convention of any “communities,” other groups of people 
or other organizations agreeing to the contents of the Convention nor do any other entities than 
“State Parties” take on any responsibility to comply with the Convention. In the British 
Columbia child welfare context, that “State Party” is the provincial government. With these 
anticipated changes to the delivery of child welfare services, it remains to be seen how the 
implementation of the Convention will play out.
The Ombudsman Act (1996) establishes the role of the provincial Ombudsman located in 
Victoria. Section 10(1) establishes that:
The Ombudsman, with respect to a matter of administration, on a complaint or on the 
Ombudsman’s own initiative, may investigate:
(a) a decision or recommendation made,
(b) an act done or omitted, or
(c) a procedure used
by an authority that aggrieves or may aggrieve a person.
In a news release of January 24, 2003, the British Columbia Ombudsman outlines how an 
anticipated budget cut of thirty-five per cent over three years will impact on the services of this 
office. Acting Ombudsman Howard Kushner states.
As an independent watchdog, my office was created to ensure that citizens are treated 
fairly by public agencies. These cuts mean 1 am no longer able to carry out my mandate
in full. I deeply regret the necessity of this action (Ombudsman British Columbia, 2003).
In addition, as there is not now nor ever has been a legal counsel role provided by the 
Ombudsman, Office for Children and Youth, or two pre-existing offices, a related issue is the 
extent to which children and youths were and are able to access legal aid and accountability 
measures on their own through the legal system where necessary. The only provision in the 
Child, Family and Community Service Act relating to independent counsel is in section 60, in 
relation to consent supervision or custody orders. As I have outlined, under this section if a child 
over 12 years old consents to such an arrangement, the Ministry is supposed to advise the young 
person to consult with independent legal counsel before the order is granted by the court. In 
addition, a judge may make a child a party to a protection hearing in which case that child should 
be entitled to speak to a lawyer. Otherwise, there is no specific legislative provision that 
provides the child or youth with the right to access counsel for non-criminal matters.
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Chapter Five: Discussion 
The Question o f Rights 
Currently, according to critical feminist discourse, a liberal notion of rights prevails in the 
Canadian legal system, a notion with which critical theorists take issue (Smart, 1989; Moller 
Okin, 1989; Comack, 1999). Smart (1989) advances an argument about the limitations of 
liberally articulated “rights” as part of feminist legal strategy:
1. Rights oversimplify complex power relations: exercises of power may have little to do 
with rights. Rights do not present a solution to these more complex matters. Such factors 
as economic dependence may prevent a person from exercising formal rights and may 
lead to undesirable consequences;
2. A vulnerable party’s rights can be countered by resort to a more powerful individual’s 
competing rights;
3. Although rights are typically formulated to address social wrongs, they are structured 
so that the onus falls on the individual to establish that a violation has occurred;
4. Rights may be co-opted for purposes not originally intended by specific statements of 
rights (Smart, 1989).
Rhode (1991) argues that critical feminism should “acknowledge the indeterminate nature 
of rights rhetoric” while in certain situations, drawing on this rhetoric to “promote concrete 
objectives and social empowerment” (p. 343). She suggests that what is important is “the 
communal, relational and destabilizing dimensions of rights-based arguments” (p. 343). 
Accordingly, this feminist perspective lays the groundwork for a revised understanding of the 
potential of human rights and the nature of the morality in which they are implicitly founded. 
Feminist legal critical discourse therefore poses challenges to the philosophical underpinnings of
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human rights law and asserts the importance of relationship, care-giving and connectedness being 
acknowledged at law.
As outlined, the Canadian legal system has proven less than optimally responsive to the 
more vulnerable members of society including women and children (Law Society of British 
Columbia, 1992; Monture Angus, 1995). Systemic biases in the legal system reflect greater 
societal patterns of discrimination, for instance, in relation to women. Aboriginal people, other 
ethnic minorities and persons with disabilities (Monture Angus, 1995; Ross, 1996; Comack, 
1999). Comack (1999) observes that whereas ‘“ equality of all before the law ’ and ‘blind justice’ 
are hallmarks of the rule of law. . .  law’s preferred person is most likely to be a male who fits the 
needs and priorities of a modem, industrial, competitive market society” (p. 23). According to 
Baer (1999), the legal system assumes that individuals are rational maximizers and will 
aggressively assert their rights. In addition, according to Comack (1999), people are abstracted 
from social context according to the rule of law; the “abstract legal person” assumes for a legal 
purpose that all persons are equal before the law in terms of freedom, capability and competitive 
ability (pp. 23-24). Cornell (1991) identifies how, according to this view, enforcing law 
“reinforce[s] the male viewpoint, in spite of law’s claim to do the exact opposite” (p. 122).
Communitarian Sandel (1982) maintains the philosophy of Kant is prevalent in 
contemporary mainstream legal theory and liberal thought. According to Mullaly (1997), a 
central tenet of liberalism is its emphasis on individual freedom, an emphasis which has provided 
a basis for individual-oriented human rights statements of law. In discussing Kant’s 
metaphysical starting point, Sandel (1982) observes :
For Kant, the priority of right is ‘derived entirely from the concept of freedom in the 
mutual external relationships of human beings, and has nothing to do with the end which
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all men have by their nature (i.e. the aim of achieving happiness) or with the recognized 
means of attaining this end’. . . As such, it must have a basis prior to all empirical ends. 
Even a union founded on some common end which all members share will not do. Only 
a union ‘as an end in itself which they all ought to share and which is thus an absolute and 
primary duty in all external relationships whatsoever among human beings’ can secure 
ju s tice .. .  Only when I am governed by principles that do not presuppose any particular 
ends am I free to pursue my own ends consistent with a similar freedom for all (pp. 5-6). 
Sandel (1982) further discusses how Kant assumed an individualistic focus. To gain justice (and 
rights) according to Kant, “we must stand at a certain distance from our circum stance.. .  as 
transcendental subject ” (Sandel, 1982, p. 175). Abstract reasoning therefore becomes necessary 
according to Kantian philosophy.
More recently, liberal theorists have built and expanded on the work of Kant (Sandel 
1982; Moller Okin, 1999). In his seminal and influential Theory o f Justice (1971), liberal 
theorist Rawls states that, “a conception of right is a set of principles, general in form and 
universal in application, that is to be publicly recognized as a final court of appeal for ordering 
the conflicting claims of moral persons” (p. 135). According to Rawls (1971),
1. A just society will give each of its members the same amount of liberties or rights;
2. If there are inequalities, a just society will make sure each citizen has equal 
opportunity;
3. Inequalities are only justifiable if they maximize the position of the worst-off members 
of society over time.
For Rawls, the starting point to arrive at justice and rights is for an individual to be able 
to position oneself in what he describes as the “original position” whereby the individual is
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theoretically abstracted from one’s circumstances. Rawls’ original position assumes that all 
people are able to be rational and mutually disinterested. People when abstracted from socio­
economic context, are able to assume a “veil of ignorance” that “prevents. . . unfairness by 
depriving the parties of the ability to identify principles that would favour their own particular 
class or group” (Scanlon, 2003, pp. 154-55). In Rawls’ version of justice, every member of 
society “accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice” (Scanlon, 2003, 
p. 157).
Critical feminist writers critique aspects of Rawls’ work. Benhabib (1987) outlines how 
for liberal theorists like Rawls, the autonomous self - that person entitled to hold rights - is 
disembedded and disembodied from social context pursuant to the law. Of the liberal 
articulation of justice, advaneed by Rawls and reflected in western law, Benhabib (1987) says, 
“this is a strange world. . . i t  is one in which individuals are grown up before they have been 
bom; in which boys are men before they have been children; a world where neither mother, nor 
sister, nor wife exist” (p. 85). She describes such liberal notion of rights as substitutive in that 
“the universalism [that this liberal theory] defends is defined surreptitiously by identifying the 
experiences of a specific g roup .. . invariably white, male adults who are propertied” (p. 81). In 
arriving at his influential version of justice, perhaps the latter was not Raw ls’ intention; however, 
feminist legal writings emphasize this perceived adult male-based standard in the law.
Some feminist legal theorists critique the liberal notion of justice and corresponding 
articulation of human rights as inadequately addressing trends of oppression in society (Baier, 
1994; West, 1997), and their comments lend further support to critical social workers’ identified 
concerns with the current Canadian child welfare policy. Whereas feminist writer Baier (1994) 
maintains that “the moral tradition which developed the concept of rights, autonomy and justice
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is the same tradition that provided justifications of [various forms of] oppression” (p. 25), West
(1997) suggests that “we must rethink or abandon the Kantian claim that reason, rather than 
‘affect’ or ‘inclination’ is the linchpin of moral action” (p. 34). Pollis (2000) further supports 
these views in suggesting that when human right become “abstract legalities, they lose their 
association with or meaning within a given community context” (p. 17). Similarly, Lacey’s
(1998) view is that “a focus on the priority of justice as between individuals and a relative lack of 
interest in collective values and in the scope for more affective virtues such as benevolence and 
altruism [represents an] impoverished view of the potentialities of social life” (pp. 54-5). These 
comments have direct relevance to the provisions of the Child, Family and Community Service 
Act with its emphasis on lengthy and potentially unworkable adult-oriented due process legal 
provisions directed primarily at the child’s parents. As I have discussed, although technical 
legal processes have a central role in the Act, the unique circumstances of children and other 
more vulnerable persons involved in the child protection system are not adequately 
acknowledged or addressed.
A dominant feminist critique of Rawls’ Theory o f  Justice (1971) centers on his failure to 
provide adequate analysis of family. Moller Okin (1989 & 1999) sees Raw ls’ failure to consider 
the institution of family in any depth as problematic. In Moller Okin’s view, if Rawls’ 
understanding of family structure is not grounded in “principles of justice but in accordance with 
innate differences. . .  imbued with enormous social significance, then [his] whole structure of 
moral development seems to be built on uncertain ground” (1999, p. 281). While feminists 
recognize that there exists in Rawls’ theory a notion of welfare state “to promote just 
distributions between citizens” (Lacey, 1998, p. 49), Baier (1994) addresses how Raw ls’ theory 
“takes it for granted that there will be loving parents rearing children” (p. 6). Baier (1995) also
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expresses coneem that attaching an obligation of care to certain members of a society that is 
defined by self-advancement, can lead to exploitation and oppression of the selfless.
Accordingly, “this trend has led to oppression of women and other vulnerable members of 
society who were expected to provide care” (Baier, 1995, p. 53). Furthering this view, Krane 
(1997) identifies a lack of explicit acknowledgement and recognition in society for carers such as 
children’s primary caregivers, which lack of recognition leads to devaluation and decreased 
public support for that role (p. 72). This comment has particular relevance in the child protection 
context where there is very little acknowledgement of or public support for children’s caregivers 
who may be among the more vulnerable members of society.
Furthermore, Young (1999) suggests that a shortcoming of Rawls’ theoretical framework 
is a failure to make enquiry “about the justice of the social processes and institutional relations 
which bring particular patterns of distribution about” (p. 300). According to Young (1999), 
Rawls’ theory needs to go a step further to question whether, rather than assume that, such 
societal institutions as competitive markets, bureaucracies and nuclear families are just. With 
respect to the British Columbia child protection context, the lack of accountability measures, 
directed at government, indicates an underlying assumption of this legislative framework that the 
State and its representatives need not be kept in check nor accountable for services provided.
In 1982, Gilligan advanced the notion of an ethic o f care distinct from justice-focused 
ethical notions. Clement (1996) outlines what she views as the primary differences between 
Gilligan’s ethic of care and an ethic of justice which she describes as Kantian-inspired (Table 
5.1).
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Table 5.1
The Ethic o f Care and the Ethic o f Justice
Gilligan’s (1982) ethic of care (Kantian) ethic of justice
1. Focus on unique, particular circumstances o f a 
situation.
1. Focus on abstract principles.
2. Assumption of human connectedness. 2. Assumption o f human separateness (choice and will 
emphasized).
3. Priorities are: maintaining relationships; meeting 
needs o f those to whom one is connected.
3. Priority is arriving at a form o f equality.
4. The concept o f autonomy is viewed as excessively 
individualistic.
4. The concept o f autonomy is central.
5. Applies to family and friends. 5. Applies to politics / civil society.
Source : Summary o f information from Clement, 1996, pp. 12-19.
The question then becomes whether human rights as understood in contemporary liberal 
theory and western law and partly derivative of Kant, are consistent with and supportive of a type 
of earing justice proposed by feminist theorists. Moller Okin (1999) suggests that at the center of 
Rawls’ liberal theory is a “voice of responsibility, care and concern for others” (p. 274); 
accordingly, she posits that Rawls’ original position requires one to “consider the identities, aims 
and attachments of every other person .. .  we must [therefore] develop considerable capacities for 
empathy and powers of communication with others” (p. 290). In this regard, Moller Okin (1999) 
would not support the care / justice dichotomy emphasized by other feminist writers such as 
Gilligan (1982) and Benhabib (1987). Similarly, Moore (1999) argues that Raw ls’ articulated 
sense of justice could only develop in an individual who had developed bonds of attachment to 
others. Moore (1999) goes a step further than Moller Okin (1999) in her suggestion that when 
care is detached from particular historical relationships and extended to everyone, stranger or not, 
it is indistinguishable from justice. In addition, Moore (1999) argues “autonomy must be 
conceived in a way that incorporates the relational insights of the ethics of care” (p. 12). These 
observations suggest that a more caring justice within the existing western justice realm is 
possible and would help address certain feminist concerns.
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West (1997) suggests the need to reconceptualize the moral idea of legal justice in such a 
way that a notion of care becomes central to the meaning of legal justice relating to both private 
and public realms of life. In other words, according to West (1997), the law needs to move 
beyond its focus on consistency, integrity and impartiality to a type of “caring justice” (p. 38) 
which acknowledges the importance of interpersonal relationships in one’s life, for instance, 
between child and care-giver. Moore (1999) argues for a more inclusive, contextual 
interpretation of justice. Her view is the “beliefs, values and relationships that people care about 
and are committed to should be seen as integral to the development of just people and just 
society” (p. 14). These visions of caring justice are consistent with the view of Seita (2000) who 
advocates that in the realm of child welfare, there is a need to move toward the following four 
child and youth development principles in children’s lives:
1. Connectedness (promoting close, positive relationships);
2. Continuity;
3. Dignity (courtesy, respect and safety);
4. Opportunity (capitalizing on one’s strengths and forming a personal vision) (p. 84). 
These perspectives are not inconsistent with human rights if rights are understood as existing 
independent of and outside the discursive enclave of contemporary law.
Other writers’ comments about the nature and potential of human rights further develop 
the critical views I have discussed. For instance, Ife (2001) contends that an ongoing struggle for 
social change is inherent in human rights, a struggle aimed at maximizing human dignity. 
Similarly, Donnelly’s (1989) view is that human rights provide context for and support for 
“rights-based demands for social change” (p. 15). Wolfson (1992) contends that human rights 
provide a more solid basis for regulating behaviour than concepts such as love or altruism in
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suggesting that rights “settle [conflicts] . . .  in a fair, non-arbitrary and consistent way”
(Wolfson, 1992, p. 9). According to Sarat and Kearns (2001), “The language of rights in 
general, and of human rights in particular, would seem to demand a grounding or foundation in 
something timeless and universal, something that establishes the transcultural and transhistorical 
basis of ethics and duty” (p. 9). It is my view that human rights can provide a means by which to 
ameliorate oppression; however, in resorting to human rights, one must not only consider and 
seek alternatives to oppressive societal relations and supporting institutions (Swift, 2001;
Mulally, 2002) but also address the significance of social context in people’s lives. Human 
rights, as articulated in liberal discourse and reflected in current Canadian law, provide only one 
step toward fuller realization of children’s rights.
Social Work Criticisms o f  Canadian Child Welfare Policy and Legislation 
Social work criticisms of the existing Canadian child welfare policy reflect and expand on 
critical feminist discourse pertaining to rights and justice. Callahan (1993b) discusses how 
Canadian child welfare policy and legislation ignore and worsen the disadvantaged position of 
women and children in the following ways:
1. The system does not address poverty or reasons for it although most women and 
children involved with the child welfare system are poor - there is a distinctive separation 
between poverty and child care;
2. Child welfare policy does not address women’s frequent inability to protect children 
from violent or sexually abusive partners;
3. Child welfare policy perpetuates a private / public division.
To address these factors identified by Callahan (1993b) would provides a concrete starting point 
for challenging patterns of oppression in the British Columbia child protection legislative
context.
Swift (1995) contends that child protection policy in Canada focuses almost exclusively 
on women and their inadequacies as mothers, a focus that diminishes an understanding of the 
social and economic context of neglect. Likewise, according to Pulkingham and Temowetsky 
(1997), “women’s inadequacies as wives and mothers’’ are a defining aspect of child welfare 
policy. Pulkingham and Temowetsky (1997) further suggest that it is only where the 
presupposed mothering role breaks down that child protection social policy, residually 
formulated, fills the gap left. Independently provided care-giving and protection therefore, are 
presumed functions of proper mothering (Krane, 1997).
Swift (1995) critiques not only the emphasis on casework putting the family as the 
location of problems but also the increasing legalization which effectively turns social workers 
into evidence collectors in anticipation of court. According to Swift (1995), this latter emphasis 
takes away the social worker’s potential to engage in relationship-building and anti-oppressive 
practices. In addition. Swift (2001) contends that the separation of child welfare policy from 
social context “creates an extremely narrow version of social reality” (p. 68) and legitimizes 
existing power relations. This comment is consistent with feminist writer Young (1999) who 
argues that a shortcoming of Rawls’ liberal justice theory is failure to consider social relations 
and supporting institutions that create power for certain members of society and not for others; in 
other words according to Young (1999), a “discussion of power as some kind of ‘stock’ which 
can be distributed obscures the fact that power, unlike wealth. . . does not exist except through 
social relations. . . and supporting institutions” (pp. 299-300).
As I have discussed, the 1996 enactment of the Child, Family and Community Service Act 
has led to increased legalization of the child protection system of British Columbia without
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specific acknowledgement of underlying social relations. As I have identified, a significant part 
of the Act sets out court process for child protection cases and the procedural steps that child 
protection workers, notably social workers, are to take. In light of this high degree of formal 
legal process, it is significant that gaps respecting children’s rights continue.
Early (2000) reports on a qualitative study that she conducted of child protection social 
workers under the current British Columbia child welfare legislative framework. The social 
workers she interviewed cited that a problem in the current legislation is the dichotomy created 
between keeping families together and protecting children; this dichotomy according to Early 
(2000) leads to interventions only in critical situations and lack of emphasis on preventative 
measures. Savoury and Kufeldt (1997) critique contemporary legislative child welfare 
approaches as being focused on provision of services only when there are protection concerns 
and inadequacy of funding to provide a continuum of support services to families.
Child welfare policy including British Columbia child protection legislation, according to 
these views, rests on particular assumptions about the family. Social work critiques of the 
legislation in this regard parallel feminist concerns about familial assumptions inherent in the 
mainstream justice ethic developed by liberal theorists such as Rawls. Krane (1997) contends 
that the very idea of viewing the family as a social unit is heavy with assumptions about parental 
roles. According to Ackelsberg and Lyndon Shanley (1996), who and what constitutes a family 
is merely a derivation of the law, and it is “im possible.. .  to distinguish clearly and permanently 
‘public’ from ‘private” ’ (p. 219). Similarly, Moroney (1991) holds that, “there is a widely held 
belief that family life is and should be a private matter. . . this approach supports the notion of 
intervention in family life only when necessary” (p. 141). If social policy treats the family as an 
entity unto itself, the role of primary caregivers within the family structure becomes lost to the
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policy eye.
This social work critique gains further support from feminist discourse. Moore (1999) 
outlines one result of the problematic public / private dichotomy in the following words: “the 
tendency to conceive of care for others as a ‘private choice,’ as a self-interested act, locates the 
problem of welfare with the single mother herself, rather than with the economic and structural 
conditions in which welfare operates” (p. 13). According to Moore (1999), being situated within 
the private realm can lead to invisibility in public policy, a phenomenon that can further 
accentuate the divide while at the same time, artificially constructing “public” social policy 
concerns as somehow more worthy of public support.
Pulkingham and Temowetsky (1997) describe how “anachronistic” social policies rest on 
“a set of contradictory prescriptions rooted in the attempt to privatize (individualize) 
responsibilities, through the ‘family’ and / or the ‘market’” (p. 19). Moller Okin (1989) critiques 
what she sees as an underlying assumption of political theories: “that the sphere of family and 
personal life [is conceived as] so separate and distinct from the rest of social life that such 
theories can justifiably assume but ignore it” (pp. 125-126). Similarly, according to Eekelaar 
(1994), the “liberal perception of the relationship between state and citizen” rests on an 
understanding that “state interventions in citizens’ lives should be as far as possible clearly 
defined and predictable” in order that parents are not “too vulnerable to unpredictable and largely 
unchallengeable impingements on their upbringing of their children” (p. 45).
In this context, the notion of care becomes something assumed to be provided by primary 
caregivers, often women, as something that lacks inherent worth before the law. Callahan 
(1993b) discusses how “child care has become women’s work, both publicly and privately, that is 
devalued and underpaid” (p. 190). Pulkingham and Temowetsky (1997) further characterize
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contemporary declining public social policy (including child welfare) trends as “neoliberal non­
interventionism” that leaves women “obliged to undertake more unpaid caring work” (p. 26).
Tied to this trend is a weakening of the welfare state and with it, a challenge to the notion 
of universality (Mishra, 1999) as articulated in international instruments such as the Convention. 
Mishra (1999) and Schwab and Pollis (2000) emphasize the increasingly significant impact of 
globalization as serving to diminish the role of the state and associated government services in 
the realm of social policy. The continuing effect that globalizing trends will have on the British 
Columbia child protection legislative scheme and associated social work practice remains to be 
seen.
In summary, social work and feminist criticism share in a number of observations that can 
be applied generally to the legal system and specifically to contemporary legislated British 
Columbia child welfare policy. Critical social work writers and feminists support how the 
current British Columbia child welfare legislation, as an aspect of the law, fails to address or 
have regard for overarching patterns of oppression in society. Whereas feminist writers stress 
how liberal legal discourse takes it for granted that women will fill caregiver roles and do not 
merit public support services to do so, a critique of child welfare policy centers on women’s 
perceived shortcomings in regard to this caregiving role. This phenomenon results in the more 
punitive and less supportive quality of British Columbia child welfare legislation and resulting 
policy. Whereas a noted shortcoming of contemporary child welfare policy is its emphasis on 
legalization at the expense of social workers’ relationship-building potential, feminist writers 
stress the need for the notion of justice to be tempered by or incorporated with care and the 
importance of personal relationships among people. In these ways, feminist critical discourse 
responds to contemporary critique of British Columbia child welfare legislation and policy.
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Chapter Six: Findings and Recommendations 
Based on the foregoing discussion, in this chapter I outline my findings in response to 
each of my research questions. Following the discussion of findings, I proceed into my 
recommendations which arise out of my findings. Appendix “A” provides an overview of my 
key recommendations and the corresponding level of policy reform required for each.
Summary o f  Findings
Research Question a: The Reflection o f  Children’s Convention Rights in the Child, Family and  
Community Service Act
There are some shortcomings in the British Columbia Child, Family and Community 
Service Act in terms of the children’s rights outlined in the Convention. Table 6.1 outlines some 
of the key shortcomings I have discussed.
Table 6.1
Key Shortcomings in the Child, Family and Community Service Act
Child, Family and Community Service Act Convention on the Rights o f  the Child
Children over 12 years old are given notice o f child 
protection proceedings but there is no specific provision 
outlining what children’s rights o f participation are. In 
addition, there is no means by which children can have 
input into administrative decisions affecting them.
Article 12 o f the Convention establishes that children 
capable of forming own views be informed of 
administrative & judicial processes affecting them and 
be given the opportunity to express their views including 
the right to attend proceedings affecting them.
The Act fails to outline the measures by which children’s 
views will be advanced / considered to determine best 
interests o f the child.
Article 3(1) o f the Convention outlines best interests o f  
the child as a primary consideration but taken with 
Article 12, children’s views (when capable) should be a 
consideration in determining best interests.
The definition of protection is adversarily constructed 
and fails to recognize government support for children 
and their caregivers as a viable means o f protection. 
The definition contains an assumption that only the 
ministry for children and families provides protection 
when a child is taken into government care.
Article 19(2) o f the Convention establishes that 
protective measures should include social programmes 
for necessary support for the child & those who have 
care o f the child.
The Act fails to acknowledge or address social context 
o f children including : poverty, violence they have 
witnessed, lack o f accessible services for children and 
their caregivers.
Article 19(2) of the Convention establishes that 
protective measures should include social programmes 
for necessary support for children & caregivers.
There is a lack o f administrative accountability 
provisions in the Act (in terms o f administrative non­
judicial decisions made) about children.
Article 25 o f the Convention provides for a child’s right 
to periodic review of treatment provided when placed by 
authority for purpose o f care or protection.
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Research Question b: Due Process and Procedural Measures in the Child, Family and 
Community Service Act
Flowing from the preceding question and findings, the due process and procedural 
measures provided for in the Child, Family and Community Service Act are legally deficient in 
terms of children’s rights. In particular, the provisions setting out children’s right to be informed 
and to participate are inadequate in terms of the Convention. Whereas the British Columbia 
legislation makes a distinction between 12 years and over and under 12 years, the Convention 
makes no such specific age distinction, focusing instead on capability. In addition, there are no 
specific participatory provisions for children in terms of court and administrative decision­
making processes in the Child, Family and Community Services Act. The availability of legal aid 
and other supports for children closely relates to this issue of due process and the extent to which 
children can realistically participate. The due process provisions in the legislation tend to focus 
on parents’ entitlements. Further, in terms of emerging alternative dispute resolution approaches 
such as family conferences and mediation, there is no legislative provision setting out children’s 
participation rights.
Research Question c: Child Advocacy
The current British Columbia child advocacy legislative provisions are lacking in terms 
of children’s rights. To consider this question, it becomes necessary to consider other legislation 
including the British Columbia Office o f Child and Youth Act (2002) and the Ombudsman Act 
(1996) alongside the Child, Family and Community Service Act. The role of the advocate would 
ideally be to assist with the protection and advancement of children’s rights. Despite the 
existence of this legislation, the scope of services provided for under the legislation is far from 
sufficient in terms of children’s rights due to the magnitude of issues potentially impacting
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children’s rights in the child welfare legislative realm.
Research Question d: The Relationship between the Treatment o f  Children’s Rights in the Child 
British Columbia Child Protection législation and Critical Discourse
The treatment of children’s rights in the British Columbia child protection legislation is 
very much premised on liberal notions of rights as articulated by such theorists as Kant and more 
recently, Rawls. A critical feminist social work lens allows for an expanded understanding of 
children’s rights as a phenomenon less individual in nature but more consistent with relationship 
and nurture characteristic of an ethic of care. As such, the notion of care becomes a central 
concern from this critical perspective. The extent to which care and relationships are considered 
alongside liberally articulated and abstractly formulated rights is a critical factor in assessing the 
extent to which the legislation addresses or fails to address children’s rights. As outlined, in 
some respects, this critical perspective is not inconsistent with the Convention which not only 
stresses the importance of children’s social context but also emphasizes their vulnerability and 
dependent circumstances. From the critical perspective then, the British Columbia child 
protection legislation is lacking for its failure to adequately address and respond to social context 
in its treatment of children’s rights. For instance, the rigorous court procedures directed at adult 
parents (who, unlike children, are seen as capable holders of rights) fails to adequately address 
the rights of children. In addition, the lack of legislative acknowledgement for social factors 
such as poverty relating to children underscores an incomplete understanding of and approach to 
children and rights protection. The lack of support services for children and their primary 
caregivers also reflects a disregard for the unique circumstances and needs of children identified 
in the Convention.
Wilson (1994) suggests that since legal discourse has shifted to child “rights,” little has
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changed substantially in related Canadian law. He argues that child protection legislation tends 
to rest on certain implied assumptions including:
1. A child belongs to only one set of parents; when one fails, a second takes over to the 
exclusion of the first;
2. A failed family is the fault of a set of parents rather than the community-at-large; 
issues such as economic deprivation and societal contribution to a state of neglect are 
considered irrelevant;
3. Betterment of a child’s circumstances requires removal from the home; therefore, 
more resources are spent outside instead of within the family;
4. Children are dependent, innocent and vulnerable so their rights relate to these concepts 
rather than them having independent and separate status (p. 3.3).
According to Wilson (1994), these underlying assumptions limit children’s rights from 
being substantively protected in the law but the question remains whether the legal system itself 
is capable of moving beyond such assumptions. As I have outlined, the notion of legal rights 
itself carries with it a bundle of related assumptions. Simon (2000) advances another view 
related to the limited application of children’s rights in child welfare law such as the Child, 
Family and Community Service Act. His perspeetive about the limited nature of children’s rights 
in child protection legislation focuses on how rights attach to the individual and what he views as 
an unnecessarily adversarial relationship created by rights between parent and child (parental 
rights versus child rights) (Simon, 2000).
As outlined, the statement of children’s rights in the Convention therefore demands a 
revised understanding of this liberal rights assumption of freedom and autonomy due to the 
unique legal and social factors associated with children. Critical social work and feminist
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discourse provide guidance in this regard. For instance, the issue of children’s dependency on 
others is clearly a central issue in regard to considering children’s rights as is the need for a more 
caring (Gilligan, 1982; Clement, 1996) approach to keeping children healthy and safe. Clement’s 
(1996) view is that increased acknowledgement and integration of an ethic of care with its focus 
on relationship needs to be further developed in liberal justice theory. She refers to justice and 
care as “indispensable allies” (p. 109) and advocates for an approach of blending the two rather 
than going to the extreme of one or the other.
Benhabib (1987) stresses the importance of an approach “that does not deny our 
embodied and embedded identity [but also which] aims at developing moral attitudes and 
encouraging political transformations” (p. 81). Children are not entirely autonomous and 
independent beings, either practically or legally. Therefore, future development of children’s 
rights will potentially lead to challenges of the underlying liberal assumptions associated with 
legal rights discourse. This reframing of children’s rights would lead to a social policy approach 
that views and treats children’s existing relationships as vitally important to their lives.
There is a need to move beyond the public / private dichotomy assumed and supported 
through contemporary residual social policy (Moroney, 1991). This approach provides 
justification for viewing a family as an independent and self-sufficient cornerstone unit of society 
(Mclnnis-Dittrich, 1994). Such an assumption in turn bolsters the perceived division between 
public and private realms and provides rationale for a policy approach that provides intervention 
only when there is perceived family breakdown and deficit in familial functioning. Feminist 
writers stress the importance of acknowledging the connection of children and family to the 
larger community (Pollis, 2000; Clement, 1996).
West (1997) and Clement (1996) discuss how an emphasis on the notion of care leads to
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recognition of the importance of interpersonal relationships between people, relationships not 
necessarily confined by the family unit. This feminist view supports a philosophical shift toward 
placing relationships and connectedness as centrally important to children’s needs and rights. In 
addition, Krane (1997) stresses the need to acknowledge and recognize the role of caregivers in 
society, in moving beyond the artificial private/ public divide. Other writers who critique the 
perpetuation of the public / private divide include: Callaghan (1993b); Pulkingham and 
Temowetsky (1997); Moller Okin (1989); Ackelsberg and Lyndon Shanley (1996); and Moore
(1999). These writers stress the importance of treating care giving to children as worthy of 
public value and support. The focus of child welfare policy instead should be protecting and 
emphasizing children’s relationships and support systems in a nurturing rather than adversarial 
manner. While 1 acknowledge this focus on relationships already occurs in certain cases, it could 
be made more of a priority on the face of the legislation: to behold children as relationship- 
holders rather than subjects and to lend support for those relationships.
Recommendations
The Definition o f  “Protection ”
Consistent with the foregoing observations, the definition of “protection” in the Child, 
Family and Community Service Act needs to be re-articulated to be more consistent with Article 
19 of the Convention which stresses the need for governments to provide social programs to 
support children and their caregivers. The concept needs to be understood more broadly to 
encompass not only government-administered protection but also caregiver-provided protection. 
Accompanying this change, there should be provision in the legislation for support of such 
protection and children’s pre-existing relationships.
This recommendation to broaden the conceptualization of protection requires a shift away
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from current adversarial child protection context and toward a cooperative approach instead. 
Consistent with this proposed shift, the legislation should inelude explieit aeknowledgement of 
children’s significant nurturing relationships including extended family and eommunity members 
where relevant and should emphasize proteeting those relationships. Supports to ehildren and 
their caregivers should not contain negative stigma and should be widely available as a publie 
ehild welfare serviee. Consideration of children’s signifieant relationships should be mandatory 
not discretionary on the part of social workers, judges and others with legislated funetions. In 
addition, there should be included in the legislation mechanisms by which anyone who has such a 
relationship with a child can have some input and involvement in deeision-making proeesses 
about the ehild’s life. Counselling and ehild advocacy services eould be designed to help identify 
these significant nurturing relationships. There may need to be a shift away from the legislated 
assumption of a nuelear family that may no longer reflect current reality for many British 
Columbia children.
In essence, support for children and their earegivers needs to be recognized as a 
fundamental right of ehildren pursuant to Artiele 19 of the Convention. This recommendation 
addresses Seita’s (2000) contention that continuity and connectedness should be important 
considerations in ehildren’s lives. Similarly, attachment theorists (Holmes, 1993) emphasize the 
eritical importance of ehildren having eonsistent attaehment to a primary caregiver in order to 
promote their emotional health and sense of security.
Acknowledgement o f  Caregiver Vulnerabilities
There should be provision in the legislation for a ehild’s caregiver who has been abused 
by another party to have additional support through any protection investigation or proeess. This 
provision is particularly important in the context of child protection mediations and other
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alternative dispute mechanisms. Accompanying services to assist the caregiver need to be 
developed, perhaps as an addition to or reformulation of existing victim support services. 
Accompanying this development, there needs to be a higher level of integration when necessary 
between child welfare and victim support services. These interrelated services should not 
operate in isolation of each other. Such a change would help redress current discriminatory 
trends in the legal system as identified by Comack (1999), MacKinnon (1989), Trerise (2000) 
and the Law Society of British Columbia (1992) whereby women are often discriminated against. 
As noted by Swift (1995 & 2001), the majority of child protection investigations in Canada 
involve single mothers. Further development and integration of caregiver-supporting services 
would also address Callaghan’s (1993b) observation that the current child protection framework 
disregards women’s inability to protect children from abusive partners.
Caregivers should not be punished for economic vulnerability but rather, supported. As 
noted by the British Columbia government (British Columbia Ministry of Children and Family 
Development, 2002), the majority of children taken into care come from homes receiving income 
assistance. Single mothers in particular require public child care support. There needs to be a 
provision in the legislation stating that relative financial positions of caregivers is not relevant in 
child welfare determinations to the issue of “ability to provide for the child.” As noted by 
Callaghan (1993b), the current child protection legislative scheme fails to consider or address 
poverty trends relating to child protection investigations; therefore, it is imperative that poverty 
be addressed directly in future British Columbia child welfare policy.
Counselling Services fo r  Children
Consistent with the ethie of care (Gilligan, 1982), there is a need for enhanced 
counselling services to support and work with children and their caregivers through the child
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protection process. Counselling services need to be annexed to or connected with the 
administration of justice infrastructure including the courts and emerging alternative dispute 
processes for improved integration and inter-connectedness of services. Child protection is an 
aspect of child welfare and as such, does not necessarily need to be as separated as is currently 
the case from other areas of child welfare, including custody and access disputes as between 
family members and quality of life considerations.
In family law custody and access disputes, section 15 of the British Columbia Family 
Relations Act (1996) currently establishes the statutory authority for a custody and access report 
to be carried out. This section states,
(1) In a proceeding under this Act, the court may, on application, including application 
made without notice to any other person, direct an investigation into a family matter by a 
person who:
(a) has had no previous connection with the parties to the proceeding or to whom each 
party consents, and
(b) is a family counsellor, social worker or other person approved by the court for the 
purpose.
Such a person then reports to the Court as to a recommended custody and access arrangement. 
Currently, this function is carried out by family justice counsellors or independent contractors. 1 
recommend that this function be further coordinated with a counselling role. Within the child 
protection realm, counsellors should be in a position to comment objectively when necessary on 
the needs of children and their caregivers. This role should be arms-length distance from child 
protection services. Some current family mediation / collaborative law processes in the province 
of British Columbia already incorporate child specialists into the process. The child specialist is
i l l
a counsellor with specialized training to provide therapeutic services to children. Currently, this 
practice relates only to marital disputes which may involve custody and access issues between 
parents. It should be expanded to child protection considerations.
Child Advocacy
There is also a need for a strengthened child advocate role in the legislative realm of child 
welfare in British Columbia. This service could be coordinated with the counselling service. As 
such, enabling legislation should more comprehensively outline the role, responsibilities and 
powers of children’s advocates to be located around the province rather than centrally located.
As identified by Smart (1989), more politically powerful persons’ rights can take precedence 
over more vulnerable persons’ in the current legal structure; advocacy services are a means of 
addressing this phenomenon for children (Bearup & Pulusci, 1999; Flekkoy, 1991). Child 
advocates need to be locally available throughout the province to enhance accessibility to their 
services. Further, they should not be constrained to either an out-of-court or in-court role. An 
office staffed by a multi-disciplinary child-centered team could effectively address both out-of- 
court and in-court interests and needs of children.
This advocacy role could also expand on Section 15 of the Family Relations Act (1996) 
which provides that social workers can prepare custody and access reports. The advocacy service 
could also function closely with the counselling service. Social workers have a skill set from 
which to draw to be effective advocates. Certainly, advocacy is of central importance to the 
profession of social work (Reamer, 1999). It is important however, that this formal role be 
somehow separated from child protection work in order to facilitate a higher level of 
accountability within the system than currently exists. The advocate could also work 
cooperatively with the child’s and caregiver’s counsellor.
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Advocates need to have skills working with children and youths so they will be viewed as 
approachable by children. A component of child advocates’ work which could be facilitated by 
social workers is education in the school system and at public functions, directed at all British 
Columbia children and youths whether or not under child protection services. This educational 
component should be instructive at the local community level and should identify children’s 
rights and outline support services available. An important role of these child advocacy services 
would be to facilitate child participation in decision-making processes that impact on their lives. 
Such advocacy services need to be accompanied by legislative changes that outline not only how 
children and youths can more fully participate but also the specific role / powers of children’s 
advocates in this regard. Child advocates need to work in concert with children and youths to 
support the latters’ ability to self-advocate and to receive response (Children’s Commission, 
1999). Legislative amendment will be required to support these advocacy measures and to 
ensure that service providers are accountable to respond in meaningful ways.
An additional function of these advocates should be to provide their own direct comment 
to government about policy matters relating to children. This information needs to come directly 
from the line-level service providers located in various locations throughout the province who 
work directly with children and youths. The provincial government, including the administration 
of child protection services, should be under a legislated requirement to respond to this child 
advocacy feedback in a meaningful way. Whereas the prior Children’s Commission and Child, 
Youth and Family Advocate commented publicly on child-related shortcomings, there were no 
legislated consequences of the government service providers not responding effectively. The 
same is the case with the observations of the provincial Ombudsman. These shortcomings need 
to be remedied so as to ensure a higher level of accountability to children (Flekkoy, 1991).
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An important aspect of the child advocate’s work would be to acknowledge and provide 
special services for children with special circumstances. Children with special needs for instance 
not only potentially require assistance in the realm of child protection but also with a myriad of 
issues pertaining to accessing special needs services. The advocate’s office would either need to 
provide specialized services to address those needs or alternatively, would need to coordinate 
very closely in a holistic manner, with other service providers in that realm. Aboriginal children 
also require particularized services. The current trend toward Aboriginal agencies assuming 
child protection jurisdiction and Aboriginal rights add further layers of complexity that relate to 
this group of children. An advocate’s office most certainly needs to be available to Aboriginal 
children who are among the most vulnerable of vulnerable in child protection matters, but 
cultural sensitivity and appropriateness of services need to be considered.
As I have outlined, a particular concern in British Columbia relates to the potential of 
decentralization of child welfare services. Child advocates need to be able to hold accountable 
the emerging service providers and to comment on the quality of the work done by those service 
providers. There needs to be direct accountability on the part of whoever is given the mandate to 
deliver child protection services to children and families to ensure children’s rights are respected 
and incorporated into delivery of services.
I specifically recommend these child advocacy centers have a legislated function for the 
following reasons:
1. Accessibility for the public -  the public can access legislation to determine what the 
role of these advocates is;
2. The way the Canadian legal system is currently set up affords formal accountability 
structures within the legislative / legal realm; such authority is an important means of
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such an advocacy office securing legitimacy in society.
Further Development o f  Alternative Dispute Resolution
Another potential out-of-court role for the recommended child advocates is participation 
in emerging alternative dispute resolution processes in the realm of child protection. These 
advocates would have responsibility for representing the child’s interests and / or rights in the 
mediation, family conference or other alternative dispute resolution process. This role could 
reflect certain aspects of the concept of the “child specialist” as it is developing in the realm of 
collaborative family models in the southern part of British Columbia. Alternative dispute 
resolution could further develop to address administrative as well as court-based decisions.
Mediation and other out-of-court processes could potentially focus on and preserve 
important relationships. An important component of alternative dispute resolution processes 
however, is attention to the rights of participants. The issue becomes particularly challenging in 
light of mediation’s focus on interests rather than rights; however, if rights are re-understood as 
encompassing caring relationships and nurture, they become potentially more consistent with and 
manageable in alternative dispute resolution processes such as mediation. It is a 
recommendation therefore that alternative dispute resolution initiatives continue; however, 
attention to and accommodation for the participants’ rights should be addressed. This rights 
aspect is particularly important due to the potential of coercion and power imbalances in 
protection matters. Mediation rests on an assumption that the participants are dialoguing with 
one another on a relatively even playing ground. Child advocates, assisted by counsel where 
necessary, can play a crucial role in keeping a rights focus for participants to such processes.
Counsellors and other pre-existing supports to children and caregivers need to participate 
in alternative dispute resolution processes so as to help ensure all parties are treated respectfully
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and can participate effectively. While acknowledgement of human rights remains critical, these 
rights need to be understood to encompass not only formal legal rights but also rights to be cared 
for and nurtured and to have supported significant relationships in ones life. The public / private 
divide needs to be challenged in these dispute resolution processes so as to recognize and support 
caregivers’ efforts in a non-punitive spirit.
Increased Legal Aid Coverage
In addition, legal aid coverage needs to be in step with the requirements of child 
protection proceedings, and counsel should be available for consultation whether the matter is 
dealt with in court or through mediated process. The entire issue of people’s access to justice in 
British Columbia needs to be reviewed in an in depth manner. Further, additional research is 
needed into the impact of fiscal cutbacks to the courts and the legal system, specifically in regard 
to the due process rights of children and their caregivers in child protection proceedings. The 
availability of legal aid for children in protection proceedings (whether court-based or not) needs 
to be improved. Children should have available to them the option of consulting with counsel 
through child advocacy services when necessary.
Unified Family Court
The Berger-led Royal Commission (1974) recommended the establishment of a unified 
family court. A unified family court would be specifically designed to address all family matters 
and all cases involving children. It would be staffed by family judges with specific skills and 
aptitudes in this area of the law and would bring together a myriad of family support and child- 
centered services including the advocates, counsellors, mediation services and court-based 
referrals to associated services. One point of interest concerning the unified family court idea is 
that it is designed to address all cases concerning children. Currently under the law, child
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protection cases are treated quite distinctly from cases involving children including other custody 
and access matters. As I have outlined, in the family realm, not only is the governing legislation 
different - Child, Family and Community Service Act versus Family Relations Act (1996) and 
federal Divorce Act (1985) - but also, the legal principles from case law have developed 
differently.
Whereas case law pertaining to family custody and access disputes between parents 
focuses on children’s “rights” language, in child protection case law to date, the predominant 
statements of judge-made law centre on parents’ rights. There has only been minimal judicial 
pronouncement about the specific rights and entitlements of children who are subject of child 
protection proceedings. It is an interesting phenomenon which is potentially explained by 
reference to the legislated “state” as protector of children, as formally established and judicially 
accepted through the legal doctrine of parens patriae.
To date, there has not occurred as much judicial consideration of children’s rights vis-à- 
vis the state apparatus in child protection proceedings. On closer examination of the implications 
of and shortcomings in the current child protection legislated policy of British Columbia, this 
lack of judicial pronouncement is a significant gap and could be attributable to lack of resources 
and ability on the part of persons directly affected by the persons directly affected by the child 
protection system to advance their concerns to appellate levels of court. At a legal practice level, 
vulnerable children tend to have neither the resources nor support to take cases to higher levels of 
court to obtain clarity around questions of law pertaining to their rights and resulting specific 
entitlements. As such, it is an area of welfare where rights can be eroded without recourse.
To use the unified family court as a means to bring child protection matters under the 
same administrative / structural umbrella as other family matters, may have a reinforcing effect in
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terms of children’s rights being acknowledged and protected in a more consistent manner under 
the law. Integration of child-centered service delivery would be a key aspect of the unified 
family court. Because of the multi-disciplinary nature of the court, a unified family court would 
provide a forum wherein legal, social and psycho-educational concerns relating to ehildren and 
their caregivers eould be considered and addressed in a more holistic and less piecemeal way 
than is currently the case. Legislative provision should set out judges’ obligations to consult with 
and consider the views of other professionals including counsellors, social workers and ehild 
advocates.
Another associated benefit of the unified family court is that because the judges would be 
appointed as both provincial and supreme court judges, they would have inherent jurisdiction 
under Section 96 of the Canadian Constitution which includes parens patriae. Current child 
protection cases are heard by provincial court judges as the judges of first instance. The vast 
majority of child protection determinations occur at that level of court before provincial statute- 
bound judges, meaning they are bound to stay within the wording of the Child, Family and 
Community Service Act and other provincial legislation, regardless of how inadequate.
Therefore, a unified family court would provide an additional layer of regard for the welfare of 
children even in the face of legislative shortcomings. Social workers could be a central part of a 
unified family court process, providing counselling, advocacy, alternative dispute resolution and 
child protection services. An important aspect of a successful unified family court would be 
multi-disciplinarity focused on providing more holistic child-centered services.
Children’s Court
The unified family court should comprise a form of children’s court wherein children and 
youths eould be directly heard in certain cases. The legislation eould be amended to provide for
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children’s recourse to this children’s court in situations where their needs within the child 
protection realm are not being addressed; further, such a court would have broader jurisdiction to 
consider other child welfare matters beyond child protection. It is my recommendation that such 
a children’s court be open to children’s counsel, child advocates and children and youths 
themselves and should have measures available to them to implement in the face of service 
providers’ failure to account for and respond to children’s needs. The presiders (whether judges 
or a less intimidating decision-maker role) of this children’s court should be required to have 
extensive experience and skills in interacting with children and youth. It would be preferable that 
the présider of the children’s court could be a mediator/ arbitrator or a type of specialized 
“master” (similar to what currently exists in British Columbia Supreme Court) as opposed to a 
judge and could make decisions that would be subject to judicial approval without the need for a 
child to re-attend in a more formal and intimidating courtroom.
Statement o f Children’s Rights
Flekkoy (1991) suggests that a service for children needs to have the interests of ehildren 
as a starting point. As identified by feminist and social work critical writers, social programs and 
support for children’s significant important relationships are crucial to the best interests of 
children. The wording of Article 19 of the Convention lends further support to this perspective. 
Canadian law clearly establishes that the “best interests of children” is the foremost consideration 
in matters involving children, but formal statements of law are only as strong as the practical 
means by which they are implemented. The eurrent British Columbia child protection legislation 
is lacking in a number of ways in regard to promoting and safeguarding children’s rights.
In addition and as identified, the rights currently set out in Section 70 of the Child,
Family and Community Service Act are hollow as they are without meaningful remedy or
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consequence to a party who does not respect and uphold them. Outside court are the myriad of 
administrative matters pertaining to children as set out in the provincial legislation. In the 
context of child protection, for instance, is the concern about children’s rights within the 
administrative decision-making framework. This shortcoming needs to be remedied by inclusion 
in the legislation of enforceable consequences for service providers who do not uphold children’s 
rights. In addition, all children in British Columbia -  whether or not in care -  need to have 
recourse to the children’s advocates.
With respect to the matter of children’s legislated rights, the advocate office needs to 
have enforceable powers to act in an investigatory and advocacy role on behalf of children. The 
Convention provides a starting point for the guiding framework and priorities that would guide 
its direction. Accompanying the establishment of these local child welfare / advocate centers or 
offices, there need to be a number of amendments to the existing British Columbia legislation. 
Providing a space for children’s own voices is an important aspect of child advocacy work and is 
called for by the Convention. In the words of Mansbridge (1996):
Both good relationships and also good democratic institutions should make the use of 
power mutually empowering so that each individual experiences the ability to cause 
outcomes by shaping others’ lives and threatening sanctions. At the same time, both 
good relationships and democratic institutions should find uses of power and stances 
toward those uses that strengthen close relations rather than disrupting them (p. 128).
As the Berger-led Royal Commission (1976) recommended, a comprehensive codification of 
children’s rights would provide a useful starting point from which to develop child welfare 
policy in a more integrated, consistent and mutually reinforcing manner. With a starting point as 
children’s rights, the shortcomings of Section 70 would be addressed.
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Without a full-scale legislated statement of children’s rights in British Columbia, I 
recommend the following amendments to Section 70 of the Child, Family and Community 
Service Act.
1. The rights enunciated there need to be expanded to relate to any children who may or 
may not be in care;
2. The rights should closely reflect the entirety of children’s rights set out in the 
Convention;
3. The rights once expanded, need to be enforceable with consequences to those persons 
(including representatives of the state) who do not abide by them.
An Enhanced Role fo r  Social Workers
As outlined, there are a number of reforms to the existing legal structure that could 
significantly improve the plight of children in British Columbia. To date, social workers’ formal 
role has predominantly been child protection work; however, the myriad of communication, 
counselling, empathetic skills that social workers develop and emphasize could allow the 
profession to move into central and more varied roles in the justice system relating to children. 
Some of the potential roles for social workers that flow from these recommendations are: child 
advocates; mediators and other alternative dispute resolution facilitators; child counsellors and 
therapists (attached to unified family and children’s courts); child specialists. In addition, social 
workers could work in a supportive role to children, their families, social supports and 
communities. Finally, they could perform as presiders in children’s court.
In appreciating children’s human rights, child protection social workers can also shift 
their practice and philosophical orientations to be more child welfare centered. The latter role 
would be further enhanced by child protection workers’ mandatory membership in a professional
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social work governing body and adherence to professional social work ethics. Governance by a 
professional body would ensure a higher level of accountability, enhanced compliance with 
professional social work ethics and increased clarity for the practice of social work in the child 
protection context. Further, being informed and knowledgeable about the issues at stake and the 
law is an important step toward a fuller and more dynamic and responsive role for social 
workers. Social workers are well-positioned to assume a lead role in rallying and lobbying for 
change on various fronts pertaining to child welfare policy.
The social work profession will have an important role in advocating for children’s 
human rights and the importance of social context in this shifting public welfare policy 
landscape. Social workers will need to exercise their critical analysis, advocacy and dialogue 
skills in calling for improved recognition of and attention to children’s rights. A llen’s (1999) 
writing supports how a feminist empowerment-based approach, as supported by Gilligan’s ethic 
of care, leads to an emphasis on preservation, nurturing and empowering of children. In calling 
for a feminist-inspired movement and change, hooks (1984) acknowledges, “leaders are needed 
and should be individuals who acknowledge their relationship to the group and who are 
accountable to it. They should have the ability to show love and compassion, show this love 
through their actions and be able to engage in successful dialogue’’ (p. 161). M ullaly’s (2002) 
writing on anti-oppressive social work supports these critical and empowerment-focused 
approaches to practice.
In considering the future applicability of the Convention and emphasizing the need to 
move beyond western imperialistic tradition, Harris-Short (2001) suggests that there needs to be 
engagement and dialogue with “the other” with the aim of reaching cross-cultural consensus 
about children’s rights. This suggestion can be applied at the local level between people with
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differing priorities and interests. Freire’s (2001) view is that “dialogue imposes itself as the way 
by which [people] achieve significance as human beings” (p. 88); he further suggests that 
dialogues must engage in thought that “discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and 
the people and admits of no dichotomy between them” (Freire, 2002, p. 92). Consistent with the 
writings of critical feminist theorists influenced by deconstructive method, Freire conceives of 
reality as an unfolding process rather than as a static entity (2001, p. 92). Accordingly, his view 
is that focus must be “the present, existential, concrete situation, reflecting the aspirations of 
people” (p. 95).
With its involvement in the BC Child and Youth Advocacy Coalition, the British 
Columbia Association of Social Workers has already started to address this concern. This 
involvement should be increasingly more proactive, vocal and central on the part of social 
workers who work within and outside the child welfare system. Collaborative and respectful 
discussions with other concerned groups and government need to continue at both provincial and 
local levels. In addition, coordination of these efforts is essential. Community-based research, 
both qualitative and quantitative, that is conducted in a respectful and inclusive manner also 
invites participation and a voice for individuals who may be affected by current child welfare 
policy trends. These efforts need to continue and expand.
To move beyond the significant limitations I have identified in the child protection 
legislative framework, social workers, including child protection social workers, need to assume 
lead roles in working with British Columbia society to identify the common values we share as 
human beings. In addition, social workers have an important potential role to play in helping to 
move society forward in terms of understanding and educating others about children’s human 
rights, participating in ongoing advocacy and support for children and other vulnerable persons.
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while acknowledging people’s dignity, maintaining professional integrity and practicing 
respectfully. In addition, social workers need to be able to comment knowledgeably on current 
social policy and legislative trends and whether they are consistent with the values for which the 
profession of social work purports to strive. Social workers will need to embrace an openness to 
move creatively and positively forward into the ever-changing British Columbia, Canadian and 
global social policy and practice context.
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Appendix ‘A ’ 
Summary of Recommendations
Recommendation
Social policy /  legislative 
change required to 
implement
Redefine definition of protection  to be consistent with Article 19 of the Convention 
on the Rights o f  the Child to include supports for and recognition of children’s 
existing nurturing relationships.
Legislative amendment
Reduction o f negative stigma for children and their caregivers who receive 
supportive services.
Legislative amendment
Expand the rights set out in Section 70 of the Child, Family and Community Service 
Act to provide for human rights set out in Convention on the Rights o f  the Child for 
all children whether or not in care
Legislative amendment
Establish remedies in the legislation in the case of violations o f and/ or lack of 
regard for children’s rights
Legislative amendment
Consider the extent to which an assumption of nuclear family reflects current 
societal trends.
Further research & legislative 
amendment.
Economically vulnerable caregiver/s to have extra child care support Legislative enactment, policy 
statement & implementation
Legislative provision that relative financial positions of caregivers not relevant to 
“ability to provide for child” and accommodation to be made for any discrepancy
Legislative enactment
Increase legal aid coverage for child protection proceedings including alternative 
dispute resolution processes
Policy amendment & 
expansion local level service 
delivery
Caregivers who have experienced abuse to receive extra support in child protection 
proceedings & corresponding integration of services
Service creation or expansion 
(victim services) local level
Establish a broader & locally situated range o f child advocacy services throughout 
the province
Legislative amendment & 
service creation local level
Establish counselling / therapeutic services for children annexed to / affiliated with 
the courts & alternative dispute resolution processes.
Possible legislative 
amendment; service creation
Child advocate centres to be multi-disciplinary & child-centred & able to provide 
both in-court & out-of-court assistance as necessary
Policy & service creation 
local level (child advocacy 
service)
Child advocates to have (local) investigatory & advocacy powers Legislative amendment
Child advocates to educate children/ youths about rights & services Service creation local level
Child advocates to be able to communicate directly with government /  legislators 
about needed changes & corresponding obligation to respond
Legislative enactment
Child advocates to be independent o f government Expansion o f current 
legislative provision
Child advocates to help identify significant nurturing relationships in children’s 
lives
Policy & service creation 
local level
Child advocates able to provide support to children and youth self-advocating on 
local case-by-case basis or to participate in decision-making processes
Policy & service creation 
local level (create child 
advocacy service)
Develop specialized child advocacy services for both Aboriginal children & 
children with special needs
Policy & service creation 
local level (specialized 
advocacy service)
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Recommendation Social policy / legisiative 
change required to 
implement
Establish unified family court to address all family matters within jurisdiction of 
both provincial and supreme court
Legislative enactment & 
service creation local level 
(create unified family court)
Legislative provision outlining judges in unified court will consult with and 
consider the views of other professionals working with the child and family.
Legislative amendment
Establish specialized children’s court in the unified family court responsive to 
administrative & court-based concerns o f children, youths, and / or their social 
supports & child advocate/s
Legislative enactment & 
service creation local level 
(children’s court)
Ensure that in emerging alternative dispute resolution processes like mediation, 
there is a focus on participants’ rights
Legislative enactment, policy 
& service creation local level.
Social workers to engage in ongoing dialogue about children’s rights at the 
provincial and community level.
Service creation local level
Move beyond public/ private distinction to recognize children and their caregivers 
as an inherent component o f community worthy o f support.
Community development; 
possible policy development
The profession o f social work to take a more central role in the justice system 
relating to children. The following are potential roles: child advocates; mediators 
and other alternative dispute resolution facilitators; counsellors (attached to unified 
family & children’s court); presiders in children’s court.
Legislative enactment (not 
necessary but would reinforce 
increased role for social 
workers) & service creation 
local level
Child protection social workers to become more child rights centred in practice & 
philosophy- membership in professional social work body & adherence to 
professional social work ethics for child protection social workers
Legislative amendment Social 
Workers Act & policy 
implementation for social 
work practice
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